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HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA - FIFTY YEARS
AFTER INDEPENDENCE
VIJAYASHRI SRIPATI
I. INTRODUCTION
August 15, 1997 marked the fiftieth anniversary of India's inde-
pendence.1 A momentous day for all citizens of the subcontinent, it is of
no less significance to the rest of the world. As the second most popu-
lous nation in the world and one occupying a significant geo-strategic
location in Asia, the triumph of democracy and the strengthening of its
roots in India augur well for international peace and security. Endur-
ing for half a century as a vibrant, democratic and secular nation of
teeming millions reflecting a rich diversity of caste, religion, language,
culture, economic and social backgrounds is an achievement for India
worthy of celebration.
This celebration has been at one and the same time an inspiring
and introspective event. India's fiftieth anniversary provides evidence
of survival, as well as an opportunity to pause and take measure of her
half century of experience in promoting human rights among her own
citizens. While India has come a long way since 1947 and has many
impressive achievements to her credit, it would be less than honest not
to take cognizance of the number of severe failings that have marked
the past five decades. It is imperative that we understand the nature
and cause of those failings, and put the lessons of the past to work in
charting a future course. In the failure to do so, those deprived of basic
rights may "blow up the structure of political democracy" that the
1. See Kennith J. Cooper, Free but Bound by their Pasts - Fifty Years After Inde-
pendence, India and Pakistan Face Same Ills, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1997 at Al, A27;
John F. Burns, India's Five Decades of Progress and Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997 at
Al, A10-All; India at 50, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997 at A26.
On August 14, 1947, at the stroke of midnight, India emerged independent after two
centuries of British colonial rule. The British had first set foot in India as traders in
1600. In that year, Queen Elizabeth I had granted a charter to the East India Company
granting it a full monopoly on British trade with India. See M.V. PYLEE, CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 47-139 (Asia Pub. House 1977) (discussing the establishment of
the East India Company, its subsequent control over India, the commencement of India's
struggle for freedom and the development leading to India's independence from Great
Britain). Taking advantage of the prevailing disunity among the Indian rulers, the East
India Company and later Her Majesty's government assumed full control over India by
the second half of the eighteenth century. Id. The British domination continued up to the
close of the second World War. In the aftermath of the war and with the disintegration of
the British Empire, independence for India became imminent. Id. at 120-139.
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founding fathers "so laboriously built up. ' 2
John Hart Ely's remark that "constitutional law appropriately ex-
ists for those situations where the representative government cannot be
trusted" evidences the crucial role of the judiciary in safeguarding hu-
man rights. 3 This is especially true of India where it is the Supreme
Court that has been constitutionally vested with wide-ranging powers
and the responsibility of protecting the citizens' human rights. 4 The
significant, and arguably controversial, role the Court has come to play
in the Indian polity can be traced back to this fact. It is sad that despite
several economic successes, India is still plagued with the ubiquitous
problems of poverty, illiteracy, housing, health, environmental degrada-
tion and exploitation, and other grave injustices. Judicial protection of
human rights, therefore, takes on a desperate urgency. The challenges
faced by the Court are daunting, and its failure to serve as a bastion of
liberties could have a potentially explosive impact: threatening the most
precious edifice of the Indian polity - democracy.
While the seriousness of India's current problems does not permit
any slackening of effort by any branch of the government, this essay ar-
gues that the Supreme Court must continue to remain at the forefront
of enforcing human rights. Article 21 is the life and liberty clause of the
Indian Constitution.5 This essay analyzes the jurisprudence of human
rights that the Supreme Court has developed out of this seminal provi-
sion since independence. This analysis will be advanced against the
backdrop of India's international obligations and international stan-
dards laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.6
This essay comprises four parts. Part I is devoted to a discussion of
the framing of India's Constitution, an analysis of its Fundamental
Rights Chapter and the Supreme Court's role in the first three decades
of independence (1947-1977). Part II critically examines the principles
and approaches that have guided the Court both in the expansion of Ar-
ticle 21 and its adoption of many procedural innovations beginning in
the late seventies. What is the relationship between international law
and municipal law in India? How informed is the Indian Judiciary of
International Human Rights Law? What use, if any, has the Court
made of international legal norms? Part III, entitled "Creative Impact
of International Human Rights Norms," analyzes these issues. The
concluding part highlights issues most in need of the Court's activist
2. Sou SORABJEE, Equality in the United States and India, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND RIGHTS 100 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Columbia University Press)
(1990).
3. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146
(1980).
4. The Supreme Court heads the unified judicial system in India. Article 32 of the
Constitution confers on every citizen the right to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction
for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.
5. Article 21 confers the fundamental right to life and personal liberty.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant].
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thrust.
II. INDIA'S FIRST HOUR OF FREEDOM
A. Framing The Constitution
On December 9, 1946, eight months prior to the formal transition of
power from the British Government to the Indians, the Constituent As-
sembly 7 convened to draft a constitution that was acceptable to all sec-
tions of free India and suitable to its peculiar needs and situation. It
was a historic occasion and marked India's first hour of freedom. To
use the words of Granville Austin, it was "perhaps the greatest political
venture since that originated in Philadelphia in 1787."8 What emerged
after thirty-six months of deliberations was not merely a political
document establishing a democratic, secular state but a document em-
bodying the blueprint of a parliamentary form of government with all
sovereignty vested in "the people."9 As articulated in its evocative Pre-
amble, 10 the Constitution, a social document, envisaged an egalitarian,
just, and humane society committed to the dignity and liberty of the in-
dividual. It therefore enshrined an array of both Fundamental Rights"
and Directive Principles, 12 which unlike the former, are non-justiciable,
but nonetheless deemed to be "fundamental in the governance of the
country," and it was the "duty" of the "State to apply these principles in
making laws."'13 Part IV embodies the socio-economic responsibility of
the state towards its citizens through provisions such as: securing for
7. Once it became clear that independence for India was imminent, the British Gov-
ernment created a semi-sovereign Constituent Assembly for India in the Cabinet Mission
Plan of 1946. The Constituent Assembly consisted of 296 elected members and was truly
a representative body. See P. MISRA, THE MAKING OF INDIA'S REPUBLIC 56 (1966).
8. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 308
(1966) [hereinafter AUSTIN].
9. India has a Parliamentary form of government with a bicameral Legislature: Lok
Sabha - (House of people or the lower house) and Rajya Sabha (House of States or the Up-
per house). The Lok Sabha is the principal legislative body. The executive wing of the
government is headed by the Prime Minister who is a member of the Lok Sabha. The
President is merely a titular head. Each of the federal states that comprises the Indian
union has its own government on a parliamentary model similar to that of the Central
(federal) Government. The Indian Constitution provides for a strong Central (federal)
Government.
10. We, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its
citizens-JUSTICE, social economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them
all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the
Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949,
do HEARBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.
11. Part III of the Constitution enumerates six fundamental rights.
12. Part IV of the Constitution contains Directive Principles of State Policy [herein-
after Directive Principles). It is interesting to note that many rights enshrined in the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights find mention as Directive
Principles in Part IV of the Indian Constitution.
13. See INDIA CONST. art. 37.
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all citizens; just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief;14
free and compulsory education; 15 and the establishment of sound inter-
national relations. 16 The communal riots and the bloody carnage that
followed partition' 7 prompted the framers to add two drastic provisions
to safeguard their nascent republic's unity and integrity. The first al-
lowed for preventive detention without trial,S even during peacetime;
the second for the suspension of certain fundamental rights during an
emergency. 19
B. Constitutional Expression Of Human Rights
"Swaraj mera janma sidh adhikar hai" (Freedom is my birthright
and I shall have it) was the daring declaration made by a great patriot,
Lokmanya B. G. Tilak, before the British Government as far back as
1895. Tilak's and subsequent freedom fighters' demands for the guar-
antee of basic human rights denied to Indians during British rule found
compendious expression in Part 111.20 The Constituent Assembly mem-
bers debated the subject of fundamental rights, "the most criticized part
of the constitution" with great passion for thirty-eight days.21 They
used the American Bill of Rights as their model in drafting the rights. 22
Thus, with respect to Part III, it was "the Potomac and not the Thames
that fertilized the flow of Yamuna." 23
The Constitution guarantees an impressive array of Fundamental
Rights covering a wide range of civil, political, cultural, economic and
social rights. These rights are subject to certain exceptions that do not
render them illusory. Originally, the Constitution guaranteed a right to
property and to obtain compensation for the property acquired by law
for a public purpose except in the crucial areas of agrarian reform.24
The Forty-fourth Constitutional Amendment introduced in 1978 re-
moved property as a fundamental right. Today, the right to property
14. Id. at art. 42.
15. Id. at art. 45.
16. Id. at art. 51.
17. On being granted independence, India was partitioned into two sovereign states:
Pakistan and India by the British Government. What ensued was a panicky exodus of
Muslims fleeing to Pakistan and Hindus fleeing to India and a communal carnage in
which about a million lives were lost.
18. See INDIA CONST. art. 22 cl. 4-7.
19. Id. at arts. 352-360. The Constitution provides for three types of emergencies:
National Emergency; State Emergency and Financial Emergency.
20. See 1 THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTITUTION 3-122 (B. Shiva Rao ed., Delhi
1968) (containing various documents relevant to the discourse of human rights before in-
dependence).
21. SORABJEE, supra note 2, at 96-97.
22. Id. at 97. See generally M. Abel, American Influences on the Making of the Indian
Constitution, 1 J. CONST. PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES 35 (1967). Many of Part III's provi-
sions correspond to the substance of one provision or the other in the United States Bill of
Rights. In fact, almost every fundamental right in the India Constitution has its counter-
part in the United States Bill of Rights. Id.
23. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192, 2212.
24. See INDIA CONST. at art. 31 (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1976.
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enjoys the status of a mere legal right.
The right to equality guarantees both equality before law and equal
protection of all laws. 25 Specific kinds of discrimination such as those
based on religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth are constitutionally
prohibited. 26 Further, the Constitution sanctions "special treatment" in
favor of women, children, scheduled castes and tribes 27 and "backward
classes" of citizens. 28 The Constitution also abolishes untouchability,
and forbids its practice in any form. 29 These provisions were designed
to eradicate the evils of casteism and untouchability that had been
practiced on a relentless scale in India. Unfortunately, they have not
yet been totally banished from modern and free Indian society.
Other crucial rights such as freedoms of speech and expression, 30 to
assemble peacefully without arms,31 to form associations, 32 to move
freely and to reside and settle in any part of the country, 33 to acquire,
hold and dispose property, 34 and to practice any profession, occupation,
trade or business, 35 have all been given constitutional protection. There
are explicit grounds on which "reasonable restrictions" can be placed in
exercising these freedoms. 36
Article 21, which enshrines the most venerable right, reads as fol-
lows: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law." Accepting an American ju-
rist, Felix Frankfurter's, sagacious advice, the framers eliminated the
original "due process" clause in this article. The resistance was not to
due process as a requirement of fair procedure but to the substantive
interpretation that could flow from it. 37 The phrase "due process" was
replaced with the "procedure established by law" clause - a term bor-
rowed from the Japanese Constitution.3 8 Articles 20 and 22 provide a
host of safeguards designed to assure a fair trial to all citizens. These
crucial provisions were inserted at the behest of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 39 to
25. Id. at art. 14 [hereinafter Equality Clause].
26. Id. at art. 15 cl. (1).
27. Members belonging to Scheduled castes are the untouchables who suffered grave
indignities prior to independence and who comprise the most oppressed minorities in the
world. Mahatma Gandhi called them "Harijans" meaning children of God.
28. See INDIA CONST. at art. 15 cl. 4. For an authoritative discussion of the Equality
Clause and Compensatory Discrimination in India see also MARK GALANTER, COMPETING
EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES OF INDIA (India 7 Gala 1984).
29. See INDIA CONST. at art.17.
30. Id. at art. 19 cl. (1) (a).
31. Id. at art. 19 cl.(1) (b).
32. Id. at art. 19 cl. (1) (c).
33. Id. at art. 19 cl. (1) (d) - (e).
34. Id. at art. 19 cl. (f).
35. Id. at art. 19 cl. (g).
36. Id. at art. 19 cl. (2) - (6).
37. See infra notes 60 and 63.
38. See SORABJEE, supra note 2, at 96-97. The framers chose the term "procedure est
by law" on the ground that its language was less ambiguous than "due process caluse."
39. Chairman of the Drafting Committee in the Constituent Assembly and the chief
architect of India's Constitution. Born as an untouchable, he had suffered grave indigni-
ties and had struggled relentlessly for the welfare of Harijans in India. He was instru-
1997
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compensate for the absence of a "due process" clause in Article 21.40
They guarantee freedom from retroactive crimes,4 1 double jeopardy,42
self-incrimination, 43 imprisonment without being informed of the
grounds of arrest, 44 the right to counsel on arrest, 45 the right to be pro-
duced before a magistrate within twenty four hours of arrest 46 and the
right to magisterial supervision in case of imprisonment for a period
beyond twenty four hours.47 The framers' serious commitment to up-
holding the dignity of the individual is amply reflected in the constitu-
tional ban on the traffic of human beings,48 'begar' and other forms of
forced labor,49 and the employment of children below the age of fourteen
years in any hazardous occupation or workplace. 50 These salutary pro-
visions are grouped under the rubric - the right against exploitation.
Freedom of religious thought, belief, practice and "institutional ex-
istence" is also guaranteed.5 1 It is interesting to note that the State has
been vested with far reaching powers to regulate this freedom not
merely in its secular aspects, in the interests of 'public order' and 'mo-
rality',"5 2 but also to effect social reform and compel public Hindu tem-
ples to open their doors to all classes of Hindus. 53 This was done with
the intention of accelerating the emancipation of Indian women and
abolishing the concept of untouchability.
Additional provisions were included to safeguard the rights of mi-
norities - any distinct religious, cultural and linguistic group. These
groups are free to establish and administer institutions to preserve
their culture, language and script.54 In cases where such institutions
receive grants from the State, they are subject to the constitutional ban
on the exercise of specific kinds of discrimination in their admission
policies.55
The right to legal remedies is the last fundamental right. It se-
mental in writing into the Constitution, the compensatory discrimination clause in favor
of untouchables or the Scheduled Castes and Tribes.
40. See infra note 69 and corresponding text.
41. See INDIA CONST. art. 20 cl. (1).
42. Id. at art. 20 cl. (2).
43. Id. at art. 20 cl. (3)
44. Id. at art. 22 cl. (1).
45. Id.
46. Id. at art. 22 cl. (2).
47. Id.
48. Id. at art. 23 cl. (1).
49. Id.
50. See id. at art. 24. See generally Lee Tucker, Child Slaves in Modern India: The
Bonded Labor Problem, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 572 (1997) (exposing the Indian Government's
lackadaisical approach in dealing with the problem of children caught in the death trap
bonded labor in India).
51. See INDIA CONST. at arts. 25-26.
52. Id. at art. 25 cl. (1) - (2) (a).
53. Id. at art. 25 cl. (2) (b).
54. Id. at art. 29 cl. (1).
55. Id. at art. 29 cl. (2)
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cures to every individual, citizens and aliens alike, the right to invoke
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for enforcing any of the fun-
damental rights. 56 This is a very significant provision in that it pre-
vents Part III from being reduced to mere chimerical constitutional
claptrap.
C. Due Process: Elimination Of This Clause From The Draft
Constitution
Although the framers borrowed heavily from the American Bill of
Rights in framing Part III, the term "due process" is conspicuously ab-
sent in the Indian Constitution. Initially, the fundamental rights sub-
committee5 7 adopted the due process clause in its classic form.58 As the
drafting of the constitution progressed, however, some influential mem-
bers of the Committee voiced their stiff opposition to its inclusion in the
Constitution.5 9 Influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the
early part of the century, B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Advisor to the
Assembly, expressed his fear that due process would become an obstacle
to social welfare legislation concerning tenancy reform, price control,
wage legislation and working conditions of laborers.60 He warned the
members that the "[C]ourts manned by an irremovable judiciary not so
sensitive to public needs in the social or economic sphere as the repre-
sentatives of a periodically elected legislature, will, in effect, have a veto
on legislation exercisable at any time and at the instance of any liti-
gant."61
Ultimately, and ironically, what hastened the elimination of the
due process clause, was the advice of the U.S. Supreme Court justice,
Felix Frankfurter.62 Drawing Rau's attention to the obstruction to so-
cial reform and the excessive judicial power that the due process clause
had created in the United States, the learned judge recommended the
omission of this clause in the Indian Constitution.63 Returning from the
United States, Rau persuaded the Committee to drop the due process
clause in the Draft Constitution because of the substantive interpreta-
tions that could be placed upon it.64 If the dangers inherent in the sub-
stantive interpretation of due process had contributed to its demise,
with regard to the property provisions in the Constitution, the conjunc-
tion of cataclysmic events in the wake of independence can be said to
56. Id. at art. 32.
57. The provisions concerning fundamental rights in the Draft Constitution were
mainly the product of the fundamental rights sub-committee. This committee began its
task in February 1947. It submitted the Draft Consideration for the approval of the Con-
stituent Assembly in February 1948.
58. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 84-85. The classic statement of the right to due process
is that of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 85-87; 101-03.
60. Id. at 86-87.
61. Id. at 87.
62. Id. at 103. See SORABJEE, supra note 2, at 96-97.
63. Id. at 96-97.
64. Id. at 102-04.
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have influenced its non-application to the irreducible claims of life and
individual liberty.
The horrors of partition and Mahatma Gandhi's brutal assassina-
tion by a Hindu fanatic in early 1948 influenced many members to opt
for preventive detention, a harsh and draconian measure, and "place
the citizens' freedom at the disposition of a legislature for the sake of a
public peace in which social and economic reforms could be achieved." 65
Since "due process," applied to life and individual liberty, renders pre-
ventive detention or detention without trial unconstitutional, it was de-
cided not to extend its safeguard to life and liberty as well. 66 Therefore,
the Draft Constitution that was placed before the Constituent Assembly
contained no due process clause. Article 15 of the Draft Constitution,
which corresponds to Article 21 in the Constitution, simply read: "No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law.'67 The phrase, "procedure established
by law," was borrowed from Article XXXI of the Japanese Constitu-
tion.68
D. Return Of Due Process: Infusion Of Its "Substance" Into The
Constitution
The peculiarities of India's political and socio-economic condition
discussed above, thus, compelled the framers to depart from the textual
and substantive details of the U.S. Constitution. Nonetheless, they
were committed to the doctrine of "due process," and therefore, they
consciously wove its "substance" into the constitutional tapestry. The
debates in the Constituent Assembly 69 and a closer reading of the fun-
65. Id. at 102.
66. Id. at 86-87, 101-04.
67. See 1 THE FRAMING OF INDIA'S CONSTITUTION, 523 (B. Shiva Rao ed., 1967).
68. Id.
69. As noted earlier, the Draft Constitution submitted to the Constituent Assembly
contained no due process clause. Many Constituent Assembly members strongly opposed
the omission of due process safeguards for life and individual liberty. They pressed for
restoring some safeguards for individual freedom. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of
the Drafting Committee, therefore moved an amendment introducing a new article: Arti-
cle 15A (in the Draft Constitution). This article corresponds to Article 22 in the Constitu-
tion that guarantees to all citizens a fair trial in a duly established court of law. Refer-
ring to the apprehensions expressed by the Constituent Assembly members on the
removal of "due process" from Article 15 of the Draft Constitution, he observed:
We are therefore, now, by introducing Article 15A, making, if I may say so,
compensation for what was done then in passing Article 15. In other words,
we are providing for the substance of the law of "due process" by the intro-
duction of Article 15A. IX. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES 1497 (empha-
sis supplied) [hereinafter C.A.D.].
At the end of the debate on the inclusion of Article 15A he again stated:
Ever since that Article (Article 15) was adopted, I and my friends had been
trying in some way to restore the content of due procedure with its funda-
mentals without using the words "due process." I should have thought that
the members who are interested in the liberty of the individual would be
more than satisfied for being able to have the prospect before them of the
provisions contained in Article 15A. Id. at 1556
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damental rights provisions make this point clear. The fundamental
freedoms clause (Article 19 clause (1)) sets out the various freedoms
such as freedom of speech, assembly and so forth.70 Clauses (2) to (6) of
the same article provide explicit grounds on which "reasonable restric-
tions" 71 can be placed by the legislature to curb these various freedoms.
It is ultimately the judiciary, however, that determines the reasonable-
ness of these restrictions. These provisions, in effect, provide for noth-
ing but due process and the police powers. For, after all, due process is
equated with reasonableness, and the judiciary, itself, applies the test
of reasonableness in determining the validity of a law restricting the
liberty of the individual. The same is true of Articles 2272 (right to a
fair trial) and 2073 that, in essence, define the contours of individual
rights protected by due process and the corresponding police powers of
the state. It is a pity that this crucial aspect escaped the attention of
the learned judges of the Supreme Court for almost three decades.
E. Constitutional Supremacy And Judicial Review
India proudly shares with the United States, allegiance to the doc-
trine of judicial review. The express declaration of fundamental rights
coupled from the introduction of judicial review74 in the Constitution
marks a radical departure with the pivotal British Constitutional doc-
trine of parliamentary supremacy. Although India is a federation (with
unitary bias) of twenty three states, the Constitution provides for a sin-
gle integrated judiciary. The Supreme Court, is the highest court in the
land and has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction. The law de-
cided by it is binding on all courts functioning within the Indian "Un-
ion" or federation. 75
70. See supra notes 30-35, at 65 and accompanying text, at 6.
71. Article 13 of the Draft Constitution corresponds to Article 19 clauses (2)-(6), of the
Indian Constitution (see supra note 36 and accompanying text). Initially, the restrictions
permitted on the seven freedoms in Article 13 were not justiciable. One of the members of
the Constituent Assembly, had made a prescient suggestion. He said:
Sir, one speaker was asking where the soul in the lifeless article 13 was? I
am putting the soul there. If you put the word "reasonable" there, the court
will have to say whether a particular Act is in the interests of the public and,
secondly, whether the restrictions imposed by the legislature are reasonable,
proper and necessary in the circumstances of the case. The courts will have
to go into the question and it will not be the legislature and the executive
who could play with the fundamental rights of the people. It is the courts
who will have the final say. Therefore, my submission is that we must put in
these words "reasonable" or "proper" or "necessary," or whatever good word
the House likes. I understand that Dr. Ambedkar is agreeable to the word
"reasonable." Otherwise, Article 13 is a nullity. It is not fully justiciable
now and the courts will not be able to say whether the restrictions are neces-
sary or reasonable. VII. C.A.D., supra note 69, at 739 - 40.
72. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
74. INDIA CONST. at art. 13.
75. Id. at art. 141. The highest courts in each of the states comprising the Indian
"Union" (Federation) are the "High Courts." All appeals from the High Courts lie to the
Supreme Court. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, any citizen can invoke the High
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The Indian Constitution was a product of the post World War II era
- a seminal period in the development of human rights. Part III also
reflects the inspirational impact of another great charter of liberties -
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - that was adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948.76 Many Fundamental Rights find
mention in both the Universal Declaration and the International Cove-
nant. Thus, Indian citizens had the good fortune to be constitutionally
blessed with many of the International Covenant's rights twenty-one
years before India became a signatory to it. 77 The table below shows
the rights that are embodied in both the Indian Constitution and the
International Covenant.
RIGHTS CONTAINED IN BOTH THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
International Covenant on: The Indian Constitution - Name of
the Right Civil and Political Rights Fundamental Rights
Article 8(3) Article 23 Freedom from
compulsory labor
Article 14(1) Article 14 Right to Equality
Article 26 Article 15 Protection against
Discrimination
based on any
ground
Article 25(c) Article 16 Right to have
access to public
service
Article 19(1) & (2) Article 19(1)(a) Freedom of
speech
Article 21 Article 19(1)(b) The Right of
Peaceful
Court's jurisdiction for the vindication of his Fundamental Rights. No citizen, however, is
barred from bypassing the High Court (at the state level) and directly invoking the Su-
preme Court's (original) jurisdiction for the enforcement of his Fundamental Rights. In-
deed, a citizen's right to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of his Funda-
mental Rights is itself a Fundamental Right (Article 32 -Right to Legal Remedies) under
the Constitution [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR Res. 71
U.N. Doc. A1811, (1948).
77. India ratified the International Covenant in 1978.
VOL. 26:1
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Article 19(1)(c)
Article 19(1)(d) &(e)
103
Assembly
Freedom of
Association
Freedom of
Movement and
Freedom to
choose one's
own residence
International Covenant on: The Indian Constitution - Name of
the Right Civil and Political Rights Fundamental Rights
Article 15 (1)
Article 14(7)
Article 14(3)(g)
Article 6(1) & 9(1)
Article 9(2)(3) & (4)
Article 18(1)
Article 27
Article 20(1)
Article 20(2)
Article 20(3)
Article 21
Article 22 & 23
Article 25
Article 29(1)
Freedom from
ex-post facto
legislation
Freedom from
double jeopardy
Freedom from
Self incrimina-
tion
Right to life and
personal liberty
Right to legal
remedies
Freedom of
thought, religion
and conscience
Rights of minor-
ities
There are rights in the International Covenant such as right to. a
speedy trial;7 8 right to free legal services; 79 freedom from imprisonment
78. International Covenant at art. 14 (3)(c).
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on the inability to fulfill a contractual obligation;80 right to travel
abroad;81 right to privacy;8 2 freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or
other degrading treatment or punishment;83 and a right to compensa-
tion to the victims of unlawful arrest or detention,8 4 which do not find
express mention in the Constitution. The manner in which these rights
will be available to the Indian citizens depends on the fashion in which
international treaty law is given domestic legal effect in India. Suffice
it to say at this point, India subscribes to the dualist view of interna-
tional law - provisions of international treaty law can be given inter-
nal legal effect only through domestic legislation. The Supreme Court
reiterated this view in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin.8 5
F. Judicial Interpretation In The Post-Independence Era:(1947- 77):
Restrictive Interpretation Of Article 21
Despite the Constitution's emphasis on individual liberty, the Su-
preme Court initially gave only a niggardly reading to Article 21. The
Court's 1950 decision in the celebrated case of A.K Gopalan v. State of
Madras8 6 underscores the judiciary's colonial hangover and conserva-
tive attitude. The petitioner who was detained under the Preventive
Detention Act challenged its validity on the ground that it violated his
right to life.8 7 What the Court did was to treat each of the Constitu-
tion's fundamental rights as separate and distinct from one another.88
The Court reasoned that when the requirements of an article dealing
with the particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no in-
fringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by that particular arti-
cle, no recourse can be had to a Fundamental Right conferred by an-
other article.8 9 On this basis, the Court treated Article 2290 as a code
unto itself.91 The Court reasoned that since the procedure in the im-
pugned act did not come into conflict with the relevant provisions of Ar-
ticle 22, its validity could be upheld. 92 The Court added that the im-
pugned act did not have to satisfy the tests of any other fundamental
rights. Further, the Court interpreted "law" in Article 21 like any other
state made law, rather than an abstract principle of natural justice.93
79. Id. at art. 14 (3)(d).
80. Id. at art. 11.
81. Id. at art. 12.
82. Id. at art. 7.
83. Id. at art. 17.
84. Id. at art. 9(5).
85. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470, 473-74.
86. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, 31-32 (Judgment of Kania, J.,).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 34-38.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
91. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 32.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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This led the Court to hold that the impugned act - a law duly enacted
by Parliament within its legislative powers - did not violate Article
21.94
By failing to invoke the procedural safeguards inherent in Article
21, the Court stunted the true meaning and scope of this venerable
right. The Court also stifled the cumulative impact of Fundamental
Rights by treating them piecemeal, rather than as an organic whole. It
would take more than two decades for this erroneous approach to give
way to a progressive interpretation.
As a first step towards building an egalitarian society, Parliament
and many State Legislatures enacted land reform legislation much to
the discontent of the landed gentry. Thus, in the post-independence
era, disgruntled landlords were the chief litigants and it was their
rights and grievances - property rights and compensation for property
acquired by the state95 - that became one of the dominant issues before
the Court. During this period, the Court displayed an excessive zeal to
protect individuals' property rights which triggered a great parliamen-
tary - judiciary controversy. 96 The Court went so far as to declare that
the Indian Parliament has no power to amend any fundamental right.97
In keeping with its image of a protector of privileged interests, the
Court also struck down the Presidential Order terminating the pensions
94. Id.
95. INDIA CONST. arts. 31 and 19 cl. (f).
96. The very first Amendment to the Constitution in 1951 resulted from the contro-
versy over the Bihar Land Reforms Act of 1950. The Patna High Court had struck down
this Act as unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the equal protection guarantee
in Article 14. Consequently, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was enacted.
It created what has come to be known as the "Ninth Schedule Immunity." Certain acts
concerning right to property were placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, which
was immunized from judicial review on the basis of Articles 14, 19 cl. (f), and 31. In State
of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170, the Court ruled that compensation
for property acquired by the state must be "full and fair," which meant the market value.
The precipitated the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. This Act ap-
pended an express provision to Article 31(2), which stated: "no law shall be called in ques-
tion in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by the law is not ade-
quate." Then came L.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, 1967 S.C. 1643. In 1970, in R.C.
Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564, the Court stoutly insisted that it will apply
the "market price" rule in determining the constitutionality of the "compensation" that
the State shall offer or pay for property acquired by it. What resulted was the Constitu-
tion (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, which replaced the word "compensation" in Ar-
ticle 31 with the word "amount." By removing the word "compensation," Parliament
hoped its troubles were over. The Act also provided an immunity against judicial review
to statutes which purported to give effect to the policy of securing principles enshrined in
Articles 39(b) and (c) of Part IV (dealing with material resources and monopolies). Judi-
cial review continued until a status quo was reached in Kesavananda v. State of Kerela,
A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. In that case, the Court declared that the right to property was not
a basic feature of the Constitution and could therefore be amended by Parliament. The
legislatures were given the power to determine the amount of compensation for property
acquired for public purpose subject to an ultimate scrutiny by the courts (emphasis
added). Ultimately, Parliament deleted the right to property from the list of fundamental
rights in 1977.
97. See L.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
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and other privileges of the erstwhile princes in India.98
Confronted with a succession of resourceful judicial opinions in-
sisting on full compensation, Parliament sought to acquire far reaching
amendatory powers to reinforce its supremacy. 99 Thus, the crucial mat-
ter of accomplishment of land reform measures was converted into an
issue of the Court's power of judicial review versus parliamentary sov-
ereignty. This was ultimately resolved in Kesavananda Bharathi v.
State of Kerela.10 0 In a delicately balanced response, the Court placed
an effective break on the emerging trend of parliamentary despotism. It
accomplished this by enunciating an innovative doctrine of inviolability
of the Constitution's "basic structure." The rationale of the Court's
judgment in this historic case is simple and cogent. Since Parliament is
only a creature of the Constitution, the Court declared that it can
amend the Constitution, but it cannot use its amending power to de-
stroy the Constitution's "basic structure."101 Accordingly, since the Su-
preme Court's power of judicial review is a cardinal feature of the Con-
stitution, Parliament cannot, even by an amendment, exclude the
Court's scrutiny of laws that profess to fulfill directive principles but
violate citizens' fundamental rights.1 02 The Court reaffirmed and ex-
panded this doctrine beyond the right to property in Indira Gandhi v.
Raj Narain.10 3 The Court struck down a Constitutional Amendment
which made the Prime Minister's election to Parliament unassailable in
a court of law on the ground that it violated the "democratic set-up" and
the "rule of law" that were essential features of the Constitution's "basic
structure" 104
Although the Court had repudiated Parliament's claim to absolute
power and lessened its scope for repression, it nonetheless acquiesced in
the subversion of the Constitution during an emergency. 10 5 In Addi-
98. See Madhava Rao Scindia v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530.
99. Parliament enacted two Constitutional Amendments: Constitution (Twenty-
fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, and Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971.
Both Amendments had great political significance. The former Act sought to provide the
widest possible meaning to the word "amendment" in the Constitution so as to empower
Parliament to add, vary, or repeal any provision of the Constitution. The latter provided
an immunity from judicial review to acts which purported to give effect to securing direc-
tive principles contained in the sub-clause (art. 39(b) and (c) dealing with material re-
sources and monopolies). Taken to their logical outer limits, such immunities rendered
judicial protection of Fundamental Rights useless.
100. (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225. See generally U. BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION:
THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE EIGHTIES 65-110 (N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. 1985)
(analyzing and discussing the significance of the decision) [hereinafter BAXI.]
101. (1973) 4 S.C.C. 486.
102. See id. at 366, 454, 486.
103. (1975) Supp. S.C.C. 1.
104. See id. at 87-93.
105. In 1975, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, was held guilty of corrupt elec-
toral practices by the judiciary. This created a furor among the opposition party members
in Parliament who called for her immediate resignation. What ensued was a proclama-
tion of emergency by the President of India at the behest of Mrs. Gandhi. Drastic preven-
tive detention laws were enacted and all of Mrs. Gandhi's political opponents were de-
tained without trial. The national press was gagged and civil liberties were drastically
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tional District Magistrate v. Shiv Kant Shukla,0 6 the Court had failed
to stand four-square between the citizens and the chasm of unre-
strained power. A Constitution Bench of the Court held that the proc-
lamation of emergency and the Presidential Order, suspending Article
21, precluded the Court from considering the constitutional validity of
any preventive detention laws. 107
Deeply wedded to the traditional concept of property rights, the
Court had for three long decades displayed scant regard to considera-
tions of creation of a welfare state in India. It had consequently served
as a bastion not of human, but of property rights. Further, it had for-
saken its vital role of the custodian of the Constitution during emer-
gency - India's gravest internal crisis since independence. Thus, de-
spite some landmark decisions, the Supreme Court of the post-
independence era made no enduring contributions towards strength-
ening constitutionalism in the subcontinent and left unfulfilled the con-
stitutional aspirations of the vast majority of the citizens.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Supreme Court Takes Suffering Seriously'0 8
In the aftermath of emergency, the Supreme Court carved a role for
itself in Indian politics quite differently from that which it had played
since independence. One of the main reasons is that the concept of con-
stitutional interpretation underwent a fundamental change in the late
seventies. The Court's path-breaking decision in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India'0 9 was the critical moment in this transformation.
Thenceforth, the Court resuscitated judicial activism after the passivity
that followed its deference to the executive during emergency. 110 The
Court, however, did this for a purpose previously absent from its his-
tory, namely, to render constitutional liberties a living reality for the
most vulnerable and powerless sections of Indian society. The Court's
metamorphosis, from an executive serving institution to that of a dy-
namic one poised to exercise its solemn constitutional responsibility
with aplomb and imaginative realism, "was partly an aspect of the post-
curtailed. The emergency remained in force from June 1975-March 1977.
106. Additional Dist. Magistrate v. Shiv Kant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1206, 1207.
107. See id. at 1241. As a result of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act,
1977, Article 21 can no longer be suspended during the proclamation of an emergency.
108. I have respectfully borrowed the idea for this appropriate heading from the emi-
nent jurist Dr. Upendra Baxi's seminal article on the role of the Supreme Court in the
post-emergency era. See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litiga-
tion in the Supreme Court of India, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES
33 (N. Tiruchelvan & R. Coomaraswamy, eds., 1987).
109. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, 616 [hereinafter Maneka Gandhi].
110. See A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207.
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emergency catharsis."11
B. Creative Expansion of Article 21
1. Right To Travel Abroad
In Maneka Gandhi, the Court observed that fundamental rights
"weave together a pattern of human rights guarantees" and that they
are not mutually exclusive and distinct.12 On this line of reasoning,
the Court held that any act that violated article 21 must meet the addi-
tional tests of anti-arbitrariness of Article 14 and reasonableness of the
fundamental freedoms clause. 113 In the Court's view, Article 21 covers a
plethora of rights - some which are implicit and others that are ex-
pressly mentioned as fundamental rights. 114 In light of the constitu-
tional ethos, mere freedom from physical restraints was not the true
scope of the term "personal liberty." Rather, the term brought within
its pale, a variety of rights that contributed to the blossoming of an in-
dividual's personality such as freedom to travel abroad.115
Significantly, the Court did not confine its scrutiny to the scope of
an individual's personal liberty. Breaking from the past, the Court ex-
amined the nature of a procedure by which a person could be deprived
of his life or personal liberty. After an elaborate survey of Anglo-
American jurisprudence, the Court emphatically declared that the pro-
cedure must be infused with the principles of natural justice." 6 The
procedure must be right, just and fair. It cannot be "arbitrary, fanciful
or oppressive."' 17
Maneka Gandhi set the stage for the efflorescence of Article 21. In
the years that ensued, Article 21, infused with the doctrines of anti-
arbitrariness and reasonableness, became a potent weapon in the hands
of a transformed judiciary that was consciously committed to redressing
the grave and glaring injustices of Indian society.
2. Right To Privacy
The right to privacy was perhaps the first dimension of Article 21
that the Court unfolded, as early as in 1963, in Kharak Singh v. State of
Uttar Pradesh.118 The petitioner, an ex-dacoit contended that police
surveillance, including their domiciliary visits to his house, violated his
right to personal liberty.119 Significantly, the Court examined the scope
111. See Baxi, supra note 108, at 36.
112. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, 620-21.
113. See id. at 622-24.
114. Id. at 622.
115. See id. at 619-22. The Court drew attention to its earlier judgment in Satwant
Singh v. Assistant Passport Officer, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836 (holding that Article 21 in-
cluded the right to travel abroad).
116. See id. at 624.
117. Id.
118. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295 (Judgment of Ayyangar, J.,).
119. See id. at 1298.
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and content of the words "life" and "personal liberty" 120 in light of indi-
vidual dignity - a cherished value underscored in the Constitution. 121
After an analysis of the issues involved and noting that freedom from
unlawful searches and seizures was absent in the Indian Constitution,
the Court concluded that domiciliary visits were in violation of a com-
mon law right to privacy. 122 Freedom from encroachments on a citizen's
private life was an "ultimate essential of ordered liberty" inherent in
Article 21.123 The Supreme Court has reiterated that Article 21 guaran-
tees the right to privacy in a 1991 decision. 124
The Court's historic ruling, that law under Article 21 had to be fair,
just, and reasonable in its procedural essence, had a humanizing impact
on the lives of all those whose liberties were curtailed. Thus, prisoners
deprived of certain fundamental freedoms were now brought under the
Constitution's protective mantle. 125
3. Freedom From Torture, Cruel, Inhuman And Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment
The case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration 26 set the trend for
the development of a humane prison jurisprudence in India. Adopting a
poignant definition of life given by an American judge, the Court
poured new meaning and content into this term which is present in Ar-
ticle 21.127 "Life, even behind the iron bars," said the sensitized judici-
ary, "did not mean mere 'animal existence'."'128 This led the Court to
hold that death row prisoners were entitled to all the amenities on par
with ordinary prisoners, that is, food, clothing and a bed. 129 Infliction of
torture, mental or physical, on such prisoners who were in the safe-
keeping of prison authorities, was unconstitutional.1 30
The Court did not stop with humanizing the life style behind the
iron bars. Applying Maneka Gandhi's rule of fair procedure to a prison
setting, the Court declared inhumane prison practices, such as arbi-
trary imposition of solitary confinement and use of iron chains on pris-
oners, 131 infliction of physical cruelty and torture, 132 routine handcuff-
120. Id.at 1305-1306
121. See INDIA CONST. art. 21.
122. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1296, 1302.
123. Id.
124. See State of Maharashtra v. M.N. Mardikar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 207.
125. As a consequence of the Court's ruling in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R.
1950 S.C. 27, individuals whose liberties were curtailed by a duly enacted law (e.g., pris-
oners) were denied fundamental freedoms, such as the right to free speech and expres-
sion, property, and intellectual pursuits.
126. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675, 1691.
127. See id. (citing Justice Field's definition of "life" in the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 142 (1877).
128. See id. at 1691, 1703, 1706.
129. See A.I.R., 1978 S.C. at 1703.
130. Id.
131. See A.I.R, 1978 S.C. at 1691 (citing Justice Field's definition of "life" in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1877).
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ing of prisoners, 133 and denial of permission to prison inmates to have
interviews with their attorneys and family members, 34 to be violative
of Article 21.
The following passage strikingly portrays the cumulative impact of
the principles of fair procedure and anti-arbitrariness in outlawing
prison caprice and cruelty:
True, our constitution has no due process clause or the VIII amend-
ment, but in this branch of law after. .. Maneka Gandhi the conse-
quence is the same. For what is punitively outrageous, scandalizingly
unusual or cruel and rehabilitatively counterproductive is unarguably
unreasonable and arbitrary and is shot down by articles 14 and 19 and
if inflicted with procedural unfairness falls foul of article 21. Part III of.
the constitution does not part company with the prisoner at the gates.
Judicial oversight protects the prisoners' shrunken fundamental rights,
if flouted, frowned upon or frozen by the prison authorities. 135
Significantly, the Court did not confine its task in these cases to
fashioning an individual relief for the petitioners. Faced with the
traumatic abridgment of prisoners' rights, the Court seized the oppor-
tunity to develop remedial processes to prevent similar future injus-
tices. To make prisoners' rights viable, the Court directed the district
magistrates concerned, to inspect the prisons in their jurisdictions once
a week; to receive complaints from individual prisoners; to take reme-
dial actions where they were deemed necessary; and to provide a griev-
ance box to which all prisoners were to be given free access. 136 The
Court did not stop with laying down such elaborate guidelines for the
treatment of prisoners. It went a step ahead and vested the power of
curtailing prisoners' liberties in judicial officers alone. It directed them
to provide all prisoners a hearing complying with the principles of natu-
ral justice before revoking any benefit available to them. 137
4. Right To A Speedy Trial
Incarceration as a pretrial prisoner for a patently long period of
time awaiting one's trial is tantamount to torture that takes many pro-
tean forms. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar,138 the Court was
faced with the desperate plight of several prisoners languishing in jail
for years without their trials having been commenced. As a conse-
quence of being denied a trial, leave alone a speedy trial, some of these
persons were incarcerated for periods exceeding the punishment that
132. See A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1579, 1584.
133. See Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1535, 1585.
134. See Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746.
135. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1690.
136. See A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1602-04; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1593-94.
137. See cases cited in notes 131-134.
138. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360.
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could have been awarded to them had they been tried and convicted. 139
Given the broad sweep and content of Article 21, it was not difficult for
the Court to rationalize that no procedure, which does not ensure a
speedy trial, could be regarded as reasonable, fair or just. Accordingly,
the right to a speedy trial - "a reasonably expeditious trial" - is im-
plicit in Article 21.140 The Court ordered the release of all the pretrial
prisoners on personal bond.14 1
5. Right To Free Legal Services
The next important step of the Court was to use the guarantees of
fair procedure and equal protection to ensure equality in criminal jus-
tice. By articulating the right to free legal services, the Court strove to
ensure equality as between rich and poor defendants and to eliminate
the inherent equality that exists between the prosecution and the de-
fendant. Stating that the "Gideon's trumpet had been heard across the
Atlantic," the Court held that free legal services is an "imperative proc-
essual piece of criminal justice" implicit in Article 21.142 In Khatri v.
State of Bihar,143 the Court took the opportunity to make an important
clarification pertaining to the new constitutional right that it had hith-
erto enunciated. Commenting on the excuse of financial and adminis-
trative inability that the state can put up to avoid its constitutional ob-
ligation, the Court rightly pointed out that "the law does not permit any
government to deprive its citizens of constitutional rights on the plea of
poverty. '144 The Court made it mandatory for every magistrate and
sessions judge to inform the accused of his constitutional right to free
legal services at the cost of the state.145 Under Hussainara Khatoon and
its progeny, every prisoner is entitled to a justiciable right to free legal
services and to a speedy trial. 146
The tremendous impact of these landmark decisions can be best
summarized in the Court's own words:
[A]ny form of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would
be offensive to human dignity and it would, on this view, be prohibited
by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure established by
law. But no law which authorizes and no procedure which leads to
such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand
the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. It would plainly be
unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. It
139. Id. at 1361.
140. Id. at 1365.
141. Id. at 1364, 1377.
142. M.M. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1548, 1554 (Judgment of
Krishna Iyer, J.).
143. Khatri v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928.
144. Id. at 931 (citing Rhem v. Malcom, 377 F.Supp. 995).
145. Id. at 931.
146. See, e.g., Kedar Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1167; Sheela Barse v.
State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378; Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (No.2),
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 736; Sukhdas v. Union Territory, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 991.
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would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to pro-
tection against torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal declara-
tion of human rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.147
6. Freedom From Imprisonment For The Inability To Fulfill A
Contractual Obligation
The right to free legal services was not the last civil and political
right that was enunciated by the Court. Other crucial human rights
were to be unfolded. In Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochini48 the
Supreme Court ruled that article 21's humane imperative for a fair pro-
cedure obligated the State not to incarcerate a judgment debtor who ei-
ther could not afford to pay his debt or had money on which there were
other pressing claims, so as to decree payment. 149 Such an interpreta-
tion was in consonance with Article 21's emphasis on human dignity. 15 o
Thus, Article 21 was infused with the flavor of Article 11 of the Inter-
national Covenant that enshrines the freedom from imprisonment for
the inability to fulfill a contractual obligation.
7. Socioeconomic And Environmental Dimension To Right To Life
In International law
Article 6 of the International Covenant and Article 3 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights embody the right to life - the most
venerable human right. Taken in its wider and proper dimension, the
fundamental right to life has both positive and negative connotations.
The right to life comprises the right of every human being not to be ar-
bitrarily deprived of his life (right to life) and the right to have the ade-
quate means of subsistence and a decent standard of life. Such a broad
meaning of the right to life is inevitable even in the case of those who
insist on regarding it strictly as a civil right. Without an adequate
standard of living that provides access to nutritious food, health and
medical care, adequate housing, the right to life would be meaningless
and illusory. From this perspective, the right to a healthy and a whole-
some environment appears as a natural corollary of the right to life. 151
147. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 753.
148. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470.
149. Id. at 475.
150. Id.
151. Prof. Louis B. Sohn opines that principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration supports
an individual's right to an environment. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 191 (1992).
Furthermore, the right to a healthy environment is recognized in a number of treaties.
Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is titled "Right to a Healthy Environment"
and states: "Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have
access to basic public services" and; "The States Parties shall promote the protection,
preservation and improvement of the environment." Additional Protocol to the American
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Today, governments are under the duty to pursue policies and adminis-
ter programs which are designed to ensure access to the means of sur-
vival for all individuals. The Supreme Court deserves to be richly
commended for its wider characterization of the threats to the right to
life in tune with the raw realities of the Indian socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental milieu.
8. Right To Earn A Livelihood
An interesting issue came before the Court in the case of Olga Tel-
lis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation.15 2 A journalist challenged the
Municipal Corporation's decision to evict pavement dwellers who were
in the path of a modernizing freeway. The petitioner argued that since
the pavement dwellers would be deprived of their livelihood if they were
evicted and deported to their place of origin, their eviction was tanta-
mount to a deprivation of their right to life and hence unconstitu-
tional. 53 This argument found a receptive audience in the Court. The
Court pointed out that although the state could not be compelled by
way of affirmative action to provide means of subsistence to all its citi-
zens, it could not deprive a person of the means to his livelihood. 54 De-
priving a person of his right to livelihood, except by a law that was
right, just and fair, was tantamount to depriving him of his life.155 The
Court halted all evictions of pavement dwellers and the demolition of
huts for a period of four years following the filing of the writ petition. 156
The Court directed the municipal authorities to provide alternative
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Nov. 17, 1988, art. 11,O.A.S.T.S, No. 69, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 521, 525 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
Article 12 (1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
states: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." Article 12(2)
further states: "The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (b) The im-
provement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene." International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12
(1) and (2), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra notes 114, 118. See also
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 24 (2)(c), 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1466
(1989), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra notes 182, 191 (requiring States' Parties to
provide children with nutritious food and potable drinking water viz. controlling health
risks due to environmental contamination).
Moreover, the constitutions of at least 44 countries, ["in the world" is unnecessary] in-
cluding the Indian Constitution, contain provisions for the protection of the environment
in one form or another. See Alexandre Charles Kiss, An Introductory Note to a Human
Right on Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (Edith
Brown Weiss ed., 1990).
152. A.I.R.1986 S.C. 180.
153. Id. at 183-184.
154. Id. at 193-94, 196.
155. Id. at 195.
156. Id. at 204.
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sites or accommodation to the slum and pavement dwellers within a
reasonable distance of their original sites.157 The Court also took the
opportunity to strongly urge the municipal government to implement a
proposed housing scheme for the poor.15 8
More recently, in the case of Banawasi Seva Ashram v. State of Ut-
tar Pradesh,159 tribals were being ousted from their forest land by the
National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC) for the establish-
ment of a huge thermal power project. 160 Observing that "the tribals for
generations had been using the jungles around for collecting the re-
quirements for their livelihood - fruits, vegetables, fodder, etc." - the
Court issued an order making such acquisition of land conditional on
NTPC's arrangements to provide certain Court-approved facilities to
the ousted forest dwellers. 161 The Court has relied on the right to live-
lihood, implicit in Article 21, in making interim orders requiring state
agencies to rehabilitate tribals in cases involving the construction of
dams and the consequent dislocation of tribals. 162
9. Right To A Clean And A Wholesome Environment
In taking its first step towards sculpting an environmental dimen-
sion to Article 21, the Court acted on the implicit premise that envi-
ronmental degradation affected the quality of life. The Court also
hinted at recognizing the environment as intrinsically worthy of protec-
tion. This new and enlightened thinking is reflected in the Court's rea-
soning in Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of
Uttar Pradesh,163 one of the first environmental complaints that was
addressed to it. The Court stated:
Preservation of the environment and to keep the ecological balance un-
affected is a task not only of governments but which every citizen must
undertake. It is a social obligation and let us remind every Indian citi-
zen that it is his fundamental duty as enshrined in Article 51a(g) of the
constitution.16 4
In that case, the Court issued interim orders halting the operation
of limestone quarries in the Doon valley, a picturesque hill station near
the Himalayan range on the ground that mining had a deleterious im-
pact on the surrounding environment. 165 Although the Court did not
specifically mention Article 21 in this case, it is obvious that the Court
was concerned with the "non-violent" threats to "life" that emanated
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 374, 375, 378.
160. Id. at 374-75.
161. Id. at 374.
162. See, e.g., Karajan Jalasay Y.A.S.A.S. Samiti v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R 1987 S.C.
532; Gramin Sewa Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1986 (Supp) S.C.C. 578.
163. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 652.
164. Id. at 656.
165. Id. at 654-56.
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from a gradually deteriorating environment.
In Subhas Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh166 the Court readily ac-
cepted a slow, steady and subtle method of extinguishment - severe
pollution - to be violative of the right to life. The Court reasoned that
life in its proper dimension could not be enjoyed unless the ecological
balance and the purity of air and water were preserved. 67 This led the
Court to come out with an express declaration that "any action that
would cause environmental, ecological, air, water pollution etc., should
be regarded as amounting to a violation of Article 21."168 In its 1995 de-
cision in Virendra Gaur v. State of Haryana the Supreme Court clearly
reiterated that Article 21 includes a Right to a clean and a wholesome
environment.169
C. Universal Scope of Fundamental Rights
1. Enforceable Against Non-State Actors
One message that comes through clearly in the above cases is that
in India it is the state that is the principal violator of the citizens' hu-
man rights. However, acute inequalities and maldistribution of wealth
and resources engender many exploitative relationships between indi-
viduals in civil society. Thus, the silent exercise of power by private en-
tities over other humans also results in some of the gravest injustices
and atrocities. In this regard, it is interesting to note that many of the
fundamental rights provisions are universal in scope; they have not
been addressed merely to the state.170 In light of these facts, one is
prompted to pose the question: Should non-state entities' actions in
certain circumstances be subject to the Court's scrutiny when they are
violative of Part III's provisions?
In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,1 1 the
Court's attention was drawn to the pitiable plight of several laborers
who were silently suffering the cruelty of contractors who were paying
them less than the legal minimum wages. 172 The contractors had been
employed by the Delhi city authorities in connection with the running of
the Asiad Games.173 The Court struck down the government's specious
plea that non-observance of labor laws by the contractors did not
166. J.T. 1991 (1) SC 531; 1991 (1) S.C. 598, 605.
167. See J.T. 1991 (1) S.C. 538.
168. Id.
169. (No.2) A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 577.
170. In Part III of the Constitution of India, the articles dealing with untouchability
(art. 17), "fundamental freedoms" (art. 19), due process (art. 21), anti-exploitation (arts.
23-24), and religious and cultural rights (arts. 25, 26, 29 and 30) are all couched in gen-
eral terms; they have not been addressed merely to the State. These rights can, therefore,
be claimed against anybody without establishing a connection with State action. INDIA
CONST. pt. III, arts. 17, 19, 21, 23-26, 29 and 30.
171. People's Union for Democratic Rights. V. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473.
172. Id. at 1483-84.
173. Id. at 1484.
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amount to a fundamental rights violation. 174 The Court cogently rea-
soned that many benefits conferred by the labor laws were intended to
ensure the workers' basic human dignity, a cherished human value in-
herent in Article 21.175 Hence, any violation of the labor laws, even by
private contractors, was a transgression of Article 21.176 Further, de-
nial of minimum wages to the laborers amounted to "forced labor" - a
violation of freedom from exploitation - a right that was "enforceable
against the whole world."'177 The Court proceeded to make the Delhi
Administration responsible for the contractors' non-observance of labor
laws.178
Not long after, came Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,179 a
case concerning the existence of bonded labor in certain stone quarries.
Although those guilty of violations were lessees of the quarries, the
Court held the Union of India and the government of the state of Hary-
ana responsible for the enforcement of the labor provisions, and the re-
habilitation of the workers who were released.180
2. Right To Education
More recently, in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka,'8 ' the Court
ruled that private institutions imparting education were amenable to
the discipline of Part III. Declaring that the right to education was a
fundamental right, the Court observed that the state was constitution-
ally obliged to provide educational facilities to its citizens at all lev-
els.182 No citizen could lead a life of dignity ensured under Article 21
unless he was educated. 8 3 Therefore, private educational institutions,
receiving accreditation from the state, could not charge an exorbitant
tuition fee for educational courses. 8 4 Commercialization of education
was both repugnant to the Indian cultural ethos and violative of the
Constitution. 185
The salutary consequence of these pronouncements is that, today,
the Court has begun drawing "private governments into the tent of
state action."'186 Protection of human rights can never be meaningful
and comprehensive, unless the Court maintains its momentum in sub-
jecting diverse discriminatory and exploitative practices and relations
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1485.
176. Id. at 1484-86.
177. Id. at 1485.
178. Id. at 1484, 1491.
179. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
180. Id. at 811-12; 828-34.
181. A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1858, 1871. See also Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, A.I.R. 1981
S.C. 481; Unnikrishan v. State of Bihar (1993) 1 S.C.C. 645.
182. Mahini Jain v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 S.C. at 1864-65.
183. Id. at 1863.
184. Id. at 1870-71.
185. Id. at 1865.
186. Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331, 1355 (citing Arthur S. Miller, The
Constitutional Law of the "Security State, 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 664 (1958)).
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between institutions and men and women in civil society to the disci-
pline of Part III.
3. Right To Compensation For Violation Of Article 21
The process of Article 21's revitalization would seem fascinating.
But, one cannot avoid believing that protecting the right to life would be
futile, if the Court merely punished a state official or a non-state entity
for its transgression. Indeed, in the absence of a constitutional right to
compensation for its violation, the grand declaration of freedom to life
and liberty would be reduced to a whisper, or a mere nullity.
It is fortunate that it was not long before the Court declared that
ordering the payment of monetary compensation for the violation of Ar-
ticle 21 fell within its wide ranging powers. The Court's bold stroke, in
1983, added new vigor to Article 21 in this regard. In Rudul Shah v.
State of Bihar,'8 7 the Court rightly conceded that the right to life would
be denuded of its significant content, unless those who violated it were
compelled to pay compensation. For the first time, the Court awarded
compensation to the petitioner, who was tortured while in police cus-
tody.188 By another bold stroke, in MC. Mehta v.. Union of India,189 the
Court ordered a privately owned company, that had permitted the
emission of noxious gases, to compensate the victims of the gas leak.
With the Court's 1993 decision in Nilabati Behera v.. State of Orissa,190
a constitutional right to monetary compensation, for the unlawful dep-
rivation of an Article 21 right, seems well entrenched. 191 Articulating
the underlying principle on which the liability of the state arose for
payment of compensation, the Court stated:
It may be mentioned straight-away that award of compensation in a
proceeding under art. 32 by this Court... is a remedy available in
public law based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental
rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply,
even though it may be available as a defense in private law in an action
based on tort. 1
9 2
Awarding compensation to the petitioner, a poor woman, for the
death of her son in police custody, the Court rightly pointed out that
this constitutional remedy had to be made more readily available in the
case of the poor who lacked the means to vigorously pursue their rights
187. A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1086, 1089.
188. Id.
189. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 982; A.I.R.
1987 S.C. 1086. See also Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802;
Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 571; Bhim Singh v. State of
Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 494.
190. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1960.
191. Id. at 1970. Such a right was distinct from, and in addition to, a right to recover
damages in private law. See id.
192. Id. at 1966 (emphasis added).
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in private law. 193
4. Discussion
A comparison of the Court's decision in the A.K Gopalan
case, 194with its later decisions in the post-emergency era, demonstrates
that although the Constitution guarantees human rights, judicial rea-
soning can either negate those rights or uphold them. Much credit then
goes to the Supreme Court judges of the late 1970s for infusing Article
21 with vitality and enriching its content. Today, many international
human rights, such as right to privacy; freedom from torture, cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment or punishment; right to a speedy trial;
right to free legal services; freedom from imprisonment on the inability
to fulfill a contractual obligation; right to compensation for unlawful ar-
rest or detention; and right to education, have become part of India's
constitutional heritage solely on account of perceptive judicial exegesis.
In its expansive interpretation of Article 21, the Court has articulated
rights that may not have been contemplated by the founding fathers.
Even so, its construction is in active unison with the inherent spirit of
the Constitution that underscores the dignity of the individual and the
promotion of a humane society. These decisions also demonstrate that
the gradual expansion of Article 21's ambit has resulted in a concomi-
tant increase in the state's responsibility towards its citizens' total well
being.
If Article 21 has become a living reality for some deprived citizens,
it is largely because of the expansive manner in which the Supreme
Court has interpreted the clause. The result has been a profound
revolution - for social justice - ever achieved by essentially peaceful
means. Indeed, it was a judge-led revolution. It is noteworthy that the
judicial renaissance of the post-emergency era bears the individual in-
signia of a few activist judges such as P.N. Bhagwati, 195 Krishna Iyer,
0. Chinnappa Reddy, D.A. Desai, and R.S. Pathak. Many of the land-
mark decisions analyzed above were handed down by these individuals.
D. The Procedural Dimension
The Supreme Court did not confine its juristic creativity to merely
unraveling the varied facets of Article 21. The Court's newly articu-
lated rights were not individual rights of eighteenth or nineteenth cen-
tury vintage. Indeed, they were "meta-rights" or collective social rights
that rendered the traditional Anglo-Saxon legal strategies woefully in-
adequate for their effective realization. 196 Responding to the challenges
193. Id. at 1969-70.
194. See A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 28.
195. Justice Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, was the
chief architect of the Social Action Litigation (or the Public Interest Litigation) movement
in India.
196. See P.N. Bhagwati, Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience, in JUDICIARY
IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 21 (N. Tiruchelvan & R. Coomaraswamy eds., 1987) [hereinafter
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erected by the emergence of these new rights and keenly aware of the
tremendous obstacles the downtrodden face in asserting their basic
human rights, it initiated bold new judicial mechanisms with imagina-
tive realism. These procedural innovations formed, in essence, the
hallmarks of a radically new category of litigation that the Court initi-
ated and fostered, such as social action litigation or public interest liti-
gation.197
1. Expansion Of Locus Standi
Facilitating popular access to courts is perhaps one of the most sig-
nificant steps taken by the Supreme Court in fulfilling the constitu-
tional aspirations of the downtrodden. Abandoning the technical and
conservative procedural rules of locus standi developed by Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence, the Court enabled "public spirited individuals" to bring
legal action on behalf of many hapless citizens whose rights had been
violated and against the state to compel it to perform its "public duties."
The following passage sums up the Court's approach to the issue of lo-
cus standi in public interest cases:
[W]here a legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a person or to a de-
terminate class of persons by reason of violation of any constitutional
or legal right... and such person or determinate class of persons is by
reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position unable to approach the Court for relief, any
member of the public can maintain an action for an appropriate direc-
tion order or writ .... 198
Thus, in one stroke, the Court had extended the range of people
with effective access to justice and the variety of issues that it could
adjudicate upon. In rejecting public interest petitions motivated by
malice and/or other personal gain, however, the Court made it clear
that the public spirited litigant was expected to be acting bona fide and
not for personal gain or any oblique consideration. 199 This procedural
innovation served as a boon to many public spirited citizens, NGOs,
journalists, social workers, environmental organizations, ecological
groups, and activist lawyers who were now able to espouse challenges
with a public interest flavor. Petitions concerning the horrifying prison
Bhagwati].
197. There is a lot of literature on public interest litigation in India. See, e.g., P.N.
Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
561 (1985); Upenda Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Su-
preme Court of India, in JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIEs 32 (N. Tiruchelvan & R. Cooma-
raswamy eds., 1987); G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent:
Current Dimensions, 40 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 66 (1991); Soli Sorabjee, Protection and Pro-
motion of Fundamental Rights by Public, 51 REV. INT'L. COMM'N OF JURISTs. 31 (1993).
198. S. P. Gupta v. President of India & Others, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, 188.
199. Id. at 189.
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scene; 200 torture of children and women in police custody and state-run
protection homes; 20 1 existence of bonded labor and forced labor; 20 2 evic-
tion of pavement dwellers; 203 protection of India's cultural heritage (ero-
sion of Taj Mahal's exquisite marble facade by pollution);204 pollution of
the sacred river Ganges;205 air pollution caused by a chlorine Plant;20 6
and by motor vehicles; 207 a plea to stop the construction of the Tehri
Dam; 208 environmental degradation caused by limestone quarrying; 20 9
and a plea to stop the disingenuous strategy of issuance of ordinances
by the Bihar State government done with a view to usurp legislative
power, 210 soon began to flood the Court. In 1993, in Tarun Bharat
Sangh, Alwar v.. Union of India,211 a social action group was permitted
standing to bring suit for the halting of mining operations in the
Sariska Tiger Park.
2. Epistolary Jurisdiction
"Epistolary jurisdiction" is another momentous procedural innova-
tion that the Court introduced. Any concerned citizen, NGO or a public
spirited individual could by writing a letter invoke the highest court's
original jurisdiction for the vindication of the Fundamental Rights of
any aggrieved individual or group of oppressed people. Forsaking pro-
cedural formalities, the Court then treated such epistles as writ peti-
tions, investigated the complaint (more often than not through Court-
appointed commissions of inquiry), made provision for legal aid if nec-
essary, heard arguments and passed interim or other orders as it
deemed necessary. Cases involving torture of prisoners, 212 torture in
police custody,213 plight of women in state-run welfare homes,214 plight
200. See, e.g., Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360; Sunil Ba-
tra v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1580; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R.
1981 S.C. 1535; Khatri v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928; Kedar Pahadiya v. State of
Bihar, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1167; Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378.
201. See, e.g., Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, (1982) 2 S.C.C. 583; Sheela Barse v. State
of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378; Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1986) 3 S.C.C. 596;
Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children's Aid Soc'y, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 656; Vikram Deo Singh
v. State of Bihar, (1988) Supp. S.C.C. 734.
202. See People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473;
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
203. See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
204. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1120.
205. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1037; M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1115.
206. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965; 1086.
207. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1332.
208. See Tehri Badh Virodhi Samiti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, JT 1990 (4) S.C. 519.
209. See Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 652.
210. See Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 378.
211. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 293.
212. See, e.g., Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1580; Prem Shanker v.
Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1535; Vikram Deo Singh v. State of Bihar, 1988 Supp.
S.C.C. 734, 736; Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378.
213. See Nilabeti Behera v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1960, supra note 190.
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of inmates in a mental institution 215 degradation of the environment, 216
existence of bonded labor 217 and eviction of pavement dwellers 218 were
brought on the judicial agenda thanks to this novel procedural rule.
3. Socio-Legal Commissions Of Fact-finding And Enquiry
The petitioners in most of the Public Interest Litigation cases were
public spirited citizens or organizations who, having limited means at
their disposal, found it onerous to establish and effectively prove viola-
tion of rights by the states before the courts.219 Their other vexing
problems included the stout denial by state governments of their well-
founded allegations and denunciation of their reliable sources of infor-
mation. 220 It is a tribute to the Supreme Court's craftsmanship, how-
ever, that it used its wide powers imaginatively to forge innovative
though unconventional ways to assist the litigants in the expensive task
of gathering evidence. The Court has evolved the practice of appointing
commissioners for the purpose of gathering facts and data regarding the
violations of citizens' fundamental rights. 22 1 The commissioners' re-
ports are then circulated among the parties concerned, who may dispute
the facts stated therein by filing affidavits. The Court then considers
the commissioner's report and affidavits that may have been filed and
proceeds to adjudicate upon the matter. 222 These commissioners are a
diverse group of individuals ranging from social activists, teachers, re-
search scholars, and journalists to government bureaucrats, technical
experts and judicial officers. 223 It is obvious that in public interest liti-
gation cases, the Court "assumes a more positive attitude in determin-
ing the facts." 224 In a case which concerned bonded labor in stone quar-
ries, the Court appointed two Supreme Court attorneys to ascertain the
true state of affairs and submit a detailed report on the basis of which it
issued far-reaching orders for the release and rehabilitation of the
214. See Upendra Baxi v. State ofU.P., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 191.
215. See Vikram Deo Singh v. State of Bihar, 1988 Supp. S.C.C. 734, 736.
216. See Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra v State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985
S.C. 652.
217. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
218. See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
219. See Bhagwati, supra note 196, at 25-26.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Ram Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 537; Rural Litigation and
Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 652, 653;
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1259; A.I.R. 1987 2426; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180; Kutti Padma Rao v. State of A.P. (1986) (Supp.) S.C.C. 574; M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965; A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2426; A.I.R. 1988 S.C.
2187; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) (Supp.) S.C.C. 734, 736; Dr. Shiv
Rao Shanta Rao Wangla v. Union of India, (1988) 1 S.C.C. 452.
222. See Bhagwati, supra note 196, at 28.
223. See Bhagwati, supra note 196, at 27.
224. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 839-48.
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bonded laborers. 225 In Tarun Bhagat Sangh Alwar v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, the Court appointed a judge-led commission to assess the con-
sequences mining in the "Sariska Tiger park" had on the environment,
wildlife and forests, and to make appropriate recommendations as to
remedial measures. 226
4. Innovative Remedies
Some of the Public Interest Litigation cases involved flagrant hu-
man rights violations that rendered immensely inadequate traditional
remedies, such as the issuance of prerogative writs by the Courts.
What was required was an "affirmative action" that ensured "distribu-
tive justice. '227 Once again, the Court did not hesitate to forge unortho-
dox remedies. Where the peculiarities of the case prompted urgent ac-
tion, the Court gave immediate and significant interim relief with a
long deferral of final decision as to factual issues and legal liability. For
instance, in a case involving the blinding of several pretrial prisoners by
the police, the Court ordered the state of Bihar to provide medical and
rehabilitative services to the blind prisoners. The Court gave directions
for such relief, even before the culpability of the police officials was de-
termined.228 The case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar229 con-
cerned the plight of a large number of young pre-trial prisoners lan-
guishing in jail without their trials having been commenced. In the
months following the filing of the writ petition, the Court issued interim
orders directing the immediate release of pre-trial prisoners on personal
bond 230 and provision of free legal aid to all the accused.231 The Court
held that a speedy trial was a constitutional right;232 and it imposed an
affirmative duty on magistrates to inform pre-trial prisoners of their
right to bail and legal aid. 23 3 The case, however, remained pending be-
fore the Court for a period of eight years without a final judgment.
The Court has also evolved the practice of appointing ombudsmen
for the purpose of ensuring and monitoring the effective implementa-
tion of its far reaching orders. In People's Union for Democratic Rights
225. Id.
226. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 293.
227. Bhagwati, supra note 196, at 28-29.
228. See Khatri v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 930-35. See also Olga Tellis v. Bom-
bay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180 (involving the halting of the eviction of pavement
dwellers for four years after the filing of the petition); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965, 982 (involving the closure of a private industry responsible for a gas
leak and the establishment of a victim rehabilitation scheme by the Court prior to its de-
termination of the issue as to whether a private actor could be held liable for the violation
of fundamental rights).
229. See Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360. See generally
U. Baxi, The Supreme Court Under Trial: Undertrials and the Supreme Court, 35 S.C.J.
1980 (analyzing the Court's bold remedies in this case).
230. See A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1364, 1369.
231. Id. at 1369.
232. Id. at 1376.
233. Id. at 1377.
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v. Union of India,2 4 the Court appointed an ombudsman, comprising
three individuals, for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of
labor laws by the contractors and the Delhi administration. 235
5. Detailed Administration Or "Creeping Jurisdiction"236
In India, where implementation of laws is tardy, government func-
tionaries are corrupt, and the concept of 'public accountability' of ad-
ministrators is conspicuous by its absence, many human rights viola-
tions owe their origin to the exercise of state powers either by
commission (repression) or omission (lawless disregard of statutory or
constitutionally imposed duties). The Court's desire, to make the en-
forcement of public duties and dispensation of "distributive justice" ef-
fective, has resulted in its involvement even in the realm of administra-
tive implementation. For instance, in a case involving the abhorrent
conditions in a mental institution, the Court went to the extent of de-
termining the amount to be allocated for provision of meals, directing
the removal of the limit placed by the hospital authorities in respect to
the cost of drugs which may be prescribed for patients. 237 The under-
lying rationale for this immersion of the Court into administrative mi-
nutiae has been its underlying conviction that justice in a country like
India often requires the taking of affirmative steps by the state. 238
Despite its significant successes in devising creative means of ad-
vancing human rights in the subcontinent, the apex Court has attracted
some criticism from those wedded to a more conservative interpretation
of the Constitution and mechanical interpretation of the rule of law.
For instance, the Court's procedure of appointing commissioners for the
purpose of assisting public interest litigants in the gathering of evi-
dence has drawn some criticism. One attorney has opined, "a judge who
appoints commissioners would be inclined to appoint those whom or
about whom he knows personally .... Such commissioners are likely to
be at least as biased as the judges who have been enthusiastic about
Public Interest Litigation. '" 239 Judges have also been accused of dis-
playing a bias in the selection of cases and "choosing their litigants. 240
234. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1473.
235. See also Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378 (involving the
appointment of a female judicial officer to oversee the implementation of the Court's di-
rectives with regrads to the treatment of prisoners); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802 (involving the appointment within the Ministry of Labor of a
joint secretary to monitor the effective implementation of the release and rehabilitation of
released bonded laborers).
236. Dr. Upendra Baxi coined the term: creeping jurisdiction.
237. See Rakesh Chand Narain v. State of Bihar (1986) (Supp.) S.C.C. 576. See also
Khatri v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 928 (involving the Supreme Court's detailed in-
struction to the State of Bihar regarding proper prison administration, including mainte-
nance of pre-trial and convict population records).
238. See Bhagwati, supra note 196, at 27-28.
239. AGRAWALA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: A CRITIQUE 26 (Tripathi Pub-
lications, Bombay 1985).
240. Id. at 17.
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The nature of the Court's directives to the executive and its unhesitat-
ing forays in the realm of implementation of its orders has led to accu-
sations that the "court is factually (not merely virtually) taking over the
administrative function" and violating the doctrine of separation of
powers. 24 1 The comment that the executive "cannot decide to start set-
tling legal cases just because the judiciary has not been able to clear the
piled up cases at every level,"242 reflects the conviction among some
members of the bar that the judiciary should consign itself to its as-
signed domain. In the words of a former Attorney Solicitor-general:
The judiciary is assigned a certain role in our (India's) constitutional
scheme of things. The apex court is for conflict resolution and it is duty
bound to interpret the Constitution; whereas policy making is assigned
to the legislature and the executive .... The judiciary is not appointed
as the monitor of the working of democracy. 243
Another voiced apprehension is that the Court may be involuntarily
embroiled in political disputes brought on the judicial agenda under the
guise of public interest litigation.244 Further, the enormous backlog of
cases in India has given rise to the "floodgates argument" - the threat
that Public Interest Litigation poses to the timely disposal of traditional
law suits filed in the Supreme Court and High Courts. 245
These matters are legitimate concerns and ought to be taken very
seriously indeed. The problems raised by Public Interest Litigation are
not insuperable. Therefore, any call for its banishment from the legal
landscape is akin to throwing the baby out with the bath water. As
Justice Kuldip Singh, an activist judge who recently retired from the
Supreme Court, rightly believes, the judiciary's encouragement to Pub-
lic Interest Litigation "is doing more good than harm," especially in the
areas of human rights, environment and corruption.246 While there
have been instances of misuse of Public Interest Litigation in the
past, 247 the Court has repeatedly insisted that the public interest appli-
cant must be a "public spirited person," "acting bona fide" and not for
personal gain and has strongly condemned the use of Public Interest
Litigation as a means of settling personal scores. 248 Further, in its zeal
to safeguard citizens' liberties, the Court has not acted in a "confronta-
tional mood or with a view to tilting at executive authority or seeking to
usurp it."249 The Court's recommendation for the creation of new bod-
ies, such as Environmental Courts consisting of a professional judge
241. Id.
242. Judicial Activism ... The Good and the Not So Good, THE HINDU, March 2, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7218402 [hereinafter Judicial Activism].
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 S.C.C. 568.
246. See Judicial Activism, supra note 242, at 11.
247. See Chetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P., (1990) 1
S.C.C. 449.
248. See Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 598, 605.
249. Bandhua Mukti Morcha, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
VOL. 26:1
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA
and two environmental scientists, 250 reveals both a mature reflection
and a realistic assessment by the judges of what they can accomplish in
their quest for dispensing social justice to the common man. Judicial
activism in India is, thus, certainly not a case of overzealous or unbri-
dled activism. The Court's approach and reasoning in public interest
cases is best reflected in Justice Pathak's observation: "we live in an age
when this Court has demonstrated while interpreting Article 21 of the
Constitution that every person is entitled to a quality of life consistent
with his human personality. The right to live with human dignity is
the Fundamental Right of every Indian citizen. '25 1
What is called for is an open minded response to the healthy criti-
cism that the Court has evoked in its approach to Public Interest Liti-
gation. Mr. Soli Sorabjee's, former Attorney-general, suggestions of
"strengthening" post-judgment monitoring and the prudent use of the
Court's contempt power to secure compliance with its orders and direc-
tions in future, merit serious consideration in this regard. 252
In the last two decades, the poor, starved and hapless millions have
received the Court's protection for securing to themselves the enjoy-
ment of basic human rights. This is no small gain. True, Public Inter-
est Litigation has some remediable drawbacks but "in a society where
freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative
public justice, some risks have to be taken."253
III. CREATIVE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Jack Greenberg, an American jurist, made a prescient observation
fifteen years ago: "it may be time for United States Courts to begin
looking to international criteria as sources of domestic law on human
rights issues"254 makes sense even for the Indian judiciary. Indeed, in a
number of common law countries, domestic courts refer to international
treaties ratified by their countries as a source of guidance in constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation. Further, "the vast array of interna-
tional human rights norms now available for use make it imperative
that we not turn completely inward in judicial attitude in ways that
deny the rich traditions of the rule of law beyond our borders."255 This
part analyzes the manner in which the normative content of interna-
tional human rights law has infused Indian Constitutional standards.
This necessitates a brief discussion of the relationship between interna-
tional law and municipal law in India.
250. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1986) 2 S.C.C. 176.
251. Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar, 1988 Supp. S.C.C. 734,736
252. Soli Sorabjee, Protection of Fundamental Rights by Public Interest Litigation in
India, 51 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS REV. 37 (1993).
253. See Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 1 S.C.C. 568.
254. Jack Greenberg, The Widening Circles of Freedom, 8 HUMAN RTS. 10, 45 (Fall
1979).
255. Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 35-36 (1983) [hereinafter Christenson].
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A. Relationship Between Municipal Law And International Law In
India
Indian Courts are potentially open to a liberal absorption of cus-
tomary international law. During British rule in India, the courts ap-
plied common law doctrines in many fields. There has been no change
in this policy even after independence since Article 372(1)of the Consti-
tution provides for "the continued operation of the law in force immedi-
ately preceding its commencement." Therefore, by the analogy to the
English common law, the municipal courts in India may apply well rec-
ognized principles of customary international law on the ground that
they form the law of the land. As regards international conventional or
treaty law, India subscribes to the dualist position. That is to say, in-
ternational treaty law has no binding effect in India unless it has been
implemented by legislation. The Supreme Court reiterated this position
in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin.256
Further, Part IV obligates the state, including the Supreme Court,
to apply the Directive Principles in the making of laws. Since the Su-
preme Court makes binding law under the Constitution,257 the duty to
employ the directive principles for the interpretation of the Constitution
and of statutes is imperative. Article 51 in Part IV provides that the
"State shall endeavor to foster respect for international law and treaty
obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another." In
light of this analysis, it can be argued that the Court must strive to in-
terpret the constitutional provisions in a manner that is in accordance
with India's international commitments and treaty obligations. Indeed,
that was the Court's approach in construing the provisions of the Indian
Code of Civil Procedure and Article 21 in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank
of Cochin.258
B. "Indirect Incorporation" Of International Human Rights Norms
As noted above, the courts in India may give effect to rules of cus-
tomary international law on the ground that they form part of the law
of the land. Therefore, a norm of customary international law, such as
freedom from torture,259 is arguably binding on the Indian courts. In
none of the cases concerning prisoners' rights, however, has the Su-
preme Court focused on the binding effect of customary international
law. Instead, the Court relied solely on the Constitution to afford the
petitioners relief, thereby securing a remedy based on domestic law. A
fundamental reason for this approach stems from the Court's unwill-
ingness to accept that the Indian constitutional values fall below inter-
national standards. As is apparent from its methodology, the Court ex-
256. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470.
257. See INDIA CONST. art. 141.
258. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 472-73
259. See Richard Lillich, The U.S. Constitution and International Human Rights Law,
3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 73, n.132 (1990). See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884
n.15 (2d Cir. 1980).
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plicitly pointed out that there is a constitutional basis for holding that
torture violated the petitioners' fundamental rights and was inconsis-
tent with the inherent spirit of the Constitution.
The fact that the Court did not use principles of customary interna-
tional law or other international human rights norms, however, to es-
tablish an independent rule of decision in its cases does not mean that
it was insulated from their wholesome impact. Indeed, the Court's fre-
quent references, in its decisions to norms laid down in treaties and
declarations, reflects its awareness of India's international obligations
and its underlying approach to take international human rights law se-
riously. 260 In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, before
embarking on a survey of the issues involved, the Court observed: "The
Court must not forget the core principle found in Article 5 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. . . and ... Article 10 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 261
In formulating elaborate guidelines for the treatment of prisoners,
the Court has drawn upon Articles 8 and 9 of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly declaration on the protection of all persons from torture,
cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. 262 In another case
involving children's rights, the Court pointed out that since India was a
signatory to the International Covenant it was obligatory on the part of
the Indian government to implement its provisions.263 More recently,
while reiterating that the award of monetary compensation for the un-
lawful deprivation of Article 21 amounted to its enforcement, the Court
referred to the International Covenant.264 It is clear that, although the
Court has decided the cases addressed to it on the basis of Indian con-
stitutional law, it has been equally desirous of being guided by interna-
tional human rights norms and standards in determining the content
and reach of the fundamental rights.
Some may perceive this "indirect incorporation" of international
human rights law to be a timid and a cautious attitude on the part of
the Indian Supreme Court. A perusal of the practice of courts else-
where in the world, however, will show that such an approach is not
unusual. Domestic courts all over the world will be, more often than
not, reluctant to base their decisions on customary international human
rights law or laws developed outside domestic law making processes
when their own constitutions are thought to be sufficient. 265 The con-
260. See, e.g., Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.
261. A.I.R 1980 S.C. 1535, 1541.
262. See A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1602.
263. See Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children's Aid Society, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 656 The
Court cited to Article 24 of the International Covenant and to the 1959 U.N. Declaration
of the Rights of the Child. Id. at 658.
264. See Nilabeti Behera v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1960. The Court referred
to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant which enshrines the right to compensation
for unlawful arrest or detention. Id. at 1970.
265. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). For an
interesting discussion on the use of international human rights norms in U.S. courts see
The Doctrine of Incorporation: New Vistas for the enforcement of International Human
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cepts of "state sovereignty" and a preference for the law of the forum
are also barriers to the use of principles developed outside the pale of
domestic law making processes. In fact, this problem has been recog-
nized in the drafting of the international lawmaking instruments. A
high degree of deference for state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction
is manifest in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights.266 This indirect incorporation of international human
rights norms is thus a sound and a realistic approach. 267 It enriches
evolving constitutional precepts and thereby ensures that internation-
ally recognized rights do not remain a mere chimera for individuals all
over the globe.
C. Influence Of International Environmental Norms
Interestingly, the Court has also cited to international environ-
mental norms in supporting its conclusions. In MC. Mehta v. Union of
India, before embarking on a survey of the issues involved, the Court
dwelt at length with the famous proclamation adopted at the UN
Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972 and the leading
role played by the Indian delegation headed by the then Prime Minis-
ter, late Mrs. Indira Gandhi at that event.268 It drew attention to the
recommendation that required States to take all possible steps to pre-
vent pollution of the seas. 269 In Law Society of India v. Fertilizers and
Chemicals, Travancore Ltd., while reiterating that the right to a whole-
some environment is implicit in Article 21, the Court referred to the
1984 UN Resolution embodying a fundamental right to an environment
adequate for health and well-being. 270 This clearly indicates that the
Rights? 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 68-86 (1983); Robert J. Martineau, Jr., Interpreting the Constitu-
tion: The Use of International Human Rights Norms 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 87-107 (1983).
266. A. Luini Del Russo, International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Appraisal,
9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749 (1968). Del Russo opines: "The effort to reach a compromise
[in passing the Covenants] has whittled away the effectiveness of the original proposal to
a point of illusory consistency. The issue of Human Rights has remained a purely politi-
cal question to be settled by sovereign States only.. ." Id.
The preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 2 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), gives great deference to state
sovereignty: "Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."
267. "Indirect incorporation" of international legal norms by domestic courts has won
widespread scholarly support. See generally Christenson, supra note 255; Richard B. Lil-
lich, The U.S. Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
53 (1990); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individ-
ual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 805 (1990).
268. (1987) 4 S.C.C. 467-69.
269. Id. at 468-69
270. 1994 A.I.R. 308 (Ker.) 370.
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Court is receptive to international environmental norms and has used
them as an interpretative tool in elaborating the constitutional provi-
sions. In essence, the Court has used human rights and environmental
norms in a "definitional manner." Further, by empowering individuals
and environmental groups to safeguard the environment and to be free
from the consequences of environmental harm or damage, the Supreme
Court has served as an effective instrument for the enforcement of envi-
ronmental justice. 271 In this connection, Principle 10 of the Rio Declara-
tion, which recommends provision of effective access to judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings (including redress and remedy by member
states for the protection of the environment), takes on special signifi-
cance.
In sum, the Supreme Court's decisions involving fundamental
rights are important landmarks in the domestic enforcement of interna-
tional human rights law. They represent the Court's enlightened inter-
pretation of the Constitution in consonance with principles of interna-
tional human rights and environmental law. A colloquium, held in
Harare in 1989, concluded that if texts of the most relevant interna-
tional and regional human rights instruments are made accessible to
judges and lawyers,
the long journey to universal respect of basic human rights will be ad-
vanced. Judges and lawyers have a duty to familiarize themselves
with the growing international jurisprudence of human rights. So far
as they may lawfully do so, they have a duty to reflect the basic norms
of human rights in the performance of their duties. In this way, the
noble words of international instruments will be translated into legal
reality for the benefit of the people we serve, but also ... of people in
every land.272"Let noble thoughts come to us from all sides" states an
ancient Vedic prayer. One hopes that in keeping with the spirit of this
noble invocation and the Harare Declaration, the Indian judiciary will
continue to enrich its jurisprudence with international learning.
IV. WHAT OF THE FUTURE?
In this author's analysis of the Supreme Court's role since inde-
pendence, she has defended and applauded the Court's expansive inter-
pretation of Article 21, its creative procedural innovations, and its indi-
rect method of weaving international human rights norms into the
constitutional tapestry. She must hasten to add, however, that that
this does not mean she applauds every decision rendered by the Court
271. See, e.g., Rural Litig. Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985
S.C. 652; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 463 (Tanneries case); M.C. Mehta
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 965 (Air pollution); Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. State
of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1109; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C.
1037 (Pollution of River Ganges); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1332
(Motor vehicles pollution).
272. Harare Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in 2 DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: A SECOND JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 9, 12 (1989).
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in the post-emergency era or is oblivious to the fact that judges can go
wrong in advancing human rights. Nonetheless, one must wonder what
the landscape of human rights would be like today were it not for the
Court's sensitivity to the harsh realities of Indian society and its juristic
activism. The preceding analysis clearly illustrates the unique contribu-
tions that the judicial process can make to the task of fulfilling the con-
stitutional aspirations of the poor and the downtrodden. It is fair to
conclude that in its role as a "social auditor,"27 3 the Court has taken
"suffering seriously" and has made a significant contribution to the
meaningful protection of human rights in India. A lot has been accom-
plished, but there is still much to be done. Indeed, at this moment
during the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of India's independ-
ence, one cannot avoid wondering if this new commitment of the judici-
ary to the poor and downtrodden - displayed after three decades of ne-
gation - will be kept? Will it continue and flourish? The landscape of
human rights in India would be one of unrelieved gloom if the Court
were to forsake its new activist role for a traditional one, merely pre-
siding over adversarial proceedings, and concluding with an order to the
parties. India, a pluralist society, can ill afford such a reactive and re-
strained judiciary. The concept of judicial activism and the need for a
judiciary to serve as a bulwark of individuals' rights from legislative
and executive encroachment is visibly highlighted on the constitutional
landscape of the world today.274 That judges make law and decide pol-
icy issues in the process of interpreting and applying the law is not a
new discovery of our times. Rather, the focus is on what and for whom
they should intervene and how far they should go. In this concluding
part, I shall highlight a few issues where the new forward surge of con-
stitutional concern is particularly required in future.
A. Strengthening Constitutionalism
The two fundamental "correlative elements of Constitutionalism"
writes Charles Mc.Lewan are "the legal limits of arbitrary power and a
complete political responsibility of government to the governed."275 It is
indeed unfortunate that the Indian political system has been rapidly
deteriorating into a brazen display of naked political power ,without ac-
countability to the real sovereigns of the land - the people. The history
of the amendment process provides ample testimony to the abuse of
constitutional processes by Parliament for partisan political ends. In
Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerela276 what was really at stake
273. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344, 354.
(Judgment of Krishna Iyer, J.).
274. See THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 179-182 (Neelan Tiruchel-
yam & Radhika Coomaraswamy eds., 1987) (giving the conclusion of the workshop on the
theme: "The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies" held in India and organized by the
International Center for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka).
275. J.N. Pandey, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 52 (1990).
276. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. See also (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, 336, 454, 486. See generally
BAXI, supra note 100, at 65-110.
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was Parliament's claim to unlimited power to make not merely changes
in the constitution but of the constitution. 277 No party in power could
abuse its majority in Parliament to convert "a Republican India into a
hereditary monarchy, a secular India into a theocratic state, a federal
India into an unitary state, an India with citizens into a [sic] India con-
sisting only of subjects."278 This was, in essence, what the Supreme
Court judges accomplished by articulating the doctrine of "basic struc-
ture." All Indians ought to be grateful to them for ensuring that tyr-
anny and despotism can no longer masquerade as Constitutionalism.
In the words of Dr. Baxi, this case has a "structural message" for the
people of India:
[F]or the atisudras, (untouchables) the social and economic proletariat,
the reaffirmation of the unchangeable basic structure not merely
marks the limits of the power of the state but also the maintenance of
civil and political space within which they can continue to articulate
their struggle against the dominating groups. 279
The recent eruption of a series of scandals has exposed the large-
scale corruption, venality of public officials, and the unholy trinity of
politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats in India. 280 Once again the
limelight is thrust squarely on the judiciary to usher in accountability
of the institutions of governance, even if in a limited sense. The Su-
preme Court's fearless directions in the Jain Diaries or the Hawala
case, ordering the Central Bureau of Investigation 281 "to investigate
every accusation made against each and every person irrespective of his
status" and not to close the case against anybody without first satisfy-
ing the Court, is indeed welcome. 28 2 It is only a display of this sort of
277. See BAXI, supra note 100, at 65-69.
278. Id. at 66.
279. Upendra Baxi, Judicial Discourse: Dialectics of the Face and the Mask, 35 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 1, 6 (1993).
280. See Zafar Agha, Hawala: Congress - Explosive Fallout, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 15,
1996, at 22; Bharat Desai, Hawala: Jain Family: The Bold and the Brazen, INDIA TODAY,
Feb. 15, 1996, at 40; N.K. Singh, Hawala: BJP: Tarred with the Same Brush, INDIA
TODAY, Feb. 15, 1996, at 28; Charu Lata Joshi, Hawala: Interrogations - Jain's Confes-
sions, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1996, at 30; Charu Lata Joshi, Hawala Charge Sheets: Inex-
plicable Lapses, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1996, at 34; Manoj Mitta, Supreme Court - Setting
the Agenda, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1996, at 62; Charu Lata Joshi, CBI: Going Soft on the
PM, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 29, 1996, at 22; JMM Payoffs, INDIA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1996, at 26;
Charu Lata Joshi, Hawala Case, INDIA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1996, at 30; Manoj Mitta & Raj
Kumar Jha, Judiciary: Mr. Justice J.S. Verma, INDIA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1996, at 98; Zafar
Agha, Under Assault, INDIA TODAY, July 31, 1996, at 24; Charu Lata Joshi, Legal Offen-
sive, INDIA TODAY, July 31, 1996, at 28; Navneet Sharma & Shefali Rekhi, Sukh Ram: The
Stench of Corruption, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 15, 1996, at 28; Charu Lata Joshi, Judiciary:
Steely Resolve, INDIA TODAY, Oct. 31, 1996, at 20; Charu Lata Joshi, JMM Payoffs Case:
Tortuous Progress, INDIA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1996, at 36; Amarnath K. Menon & G.C. Shek-
har, J. Jayalalitha: Booty Queen, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1996, at 20; Harinder Baweja,
Jain Hawala Case: Stuck in Legalese, INDIA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1997, at 44.
281. The Central Bureau of Investigation is the nation's premier investigative agency.
282. Manoj Mitta & Raj Kumar Jha, Judiciary - Mr. Justice J.S. Verma, INDIA TODAY,
Mar. 15, 1996, at 112. In March 1997, Mr. J.S. Verma was elevated to the post of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India.
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judicial assertiveness that can restore a modicum of the two crucial
"correlative elements of Constitutionalism" to the Indian polity that is
now facing a new internal and insidious peril - corruption.
It is, however, insufficient if the Court confines its role merely to
that of a watchdog to check the arbitrariness of the executive and the
legislature. If the roots of democracy are to be cemented in India, it is
essential that the constitutional processes be involved in issues of pov-
erty, political repression, social and environmental justice and the pro-
tection of the most vulnerable sections of society such as the ethnic
groups, Scheduled Castes and Tribes, women, children, criminal and
terrorists suspects, prisoners and other unpopular minorities.
B. Women's Rights
Women often are the most vulnerable and exploited group in any
society. This is equally true of India where the constitutional guaran-
tees have not had much impact on their lives. In India members of dif-
ferent religious communities are governed by their personal religious
laws in matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. These
laws are in many respects discriminatory and violative of women's hu-
man rights.28 3 For instance, polygamy, an abhorrent practice prevalent
among the Muslim population has survived constitutional challenge on
the grounds that it involved discrimination against women on the basis
of religion as well as gender. 28 4 In the absence of an Uniform Civil Code
women have no escape from the oppressive clutches of their personal
laws and their emancipation remains a far cry. While the Court has
boldly asserted that a "custom" 28 5 "must yield to a fundamental
right"28 6 it is a pity that it has not subjected oppressive personal relig-
ious laws to the rigor of Article 21 and the Equality Clauses of Part III.
True, the Constitution guarantees religious freedom. But, it also un-
derscores the dignity of the individual. Therefore, any practice which
denigrates women ought not to escape the constitutional gauntlet
masked as a "personal religious law." In a recent decision, the Supreme
Court has called upon the government to introduce an Uniform Civil
Code to pave the way for women's liberation and strengthen national
unity.28 7 Significantly, the Court also noted with approval the prohibi-
tion of polygamy in the United States on the ground of public morals
and expressly criticized its practice in India.28 8 This new change of atti-
283. See generally Anika Rahman, Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India: A
Test Case for International Human Rights Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473 (1990)
(discussing the Indian Supreme Court's valiant attempt to secularize Muslim personal
law in India); Farah Baria, Gender: Marital Laws, INDIA TODAY, June 30, 1997, at 60.
284. See e.g., State of Bombay v. Narasau Appu, A.I.R. 1952 Bombay 85; Sambu Reccy
v. G. Jayamma, A.I.R. 1972 A.P. 136; Sonu Bai v. Bala A.I.R. 1983 Bombay 156.
285. The Supreme Court's power of judicial review is not confined to statutes and laws.
It also extends to Custom or Usage. See INDIA CONST. art. 13 cl. (2).
286. See Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 564, 570.
287. See Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors v. Union of India and Ors, J.T. 1995
(4) 331.
288. Id. at 345-346.
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tude is welcome as an important beginning for judicial activism vis-et-
vis women's rights. One hopes that in the years to come, the Court will
construe Article 21 as mandating gender justice and fairness within the
family.
C. Protection Of Prisoners And Mentally Ill Persons
In Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar,28 9 the Court was faced with the
horrifying situation where persons who were detained in state-run
homes on account of their alleged insanity continued to be incarcerated
for years even after they had been certified as having regained their
sanity. Yet another case, Tomar v. State of Bihar 290 exposed the sub-
human conditions in which individuals in a "care home" were confined.
The district magistrate's report revealed that the "Care Home" was a
"crowded hovel, in which a large number of human beings had been
thrown together, compelled to subsist in animal survival conditions
which blatantly denied their basic humanity."291 These cases typify the
brutal and inhumane conditions that homeless and mentally ill persons
are forced to exist in Indian society. The situation with respect to con-
ditions in Indian penal institutions is no better.292 Penal institutions
and State run welfare homes for the poor and the mentally ill are
plagued with the same problems: serious overcrowding; unsanitary and
understaffed physical facilities; insufficient medical and psychiatric
services; and deplorable material conditions that have made rehabilita-
tion of the inmates well nigh impossible. The Supreme Court has in its
judgments hauled up the government for this horrible state of affairs,
provided elaborate guidelines for the treatment of such individuals,
and, in certain instances, has virtually taken over the administration of
these institutions. For instance, the Agra Protective Home for women
has been virtually run by the judiciary for well over ten years.293 The
degrading brutal conditions exposed and challenged in these cases are
undoubtedly the product of legislative and bureaucratic apathy, cal-
lousness and of course budgetary constraints. Part III exists as much
for the propertied class as for those confined to prisons and welfare
homes. Therefore, if judicial intervention should be exercised for the
289. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, (1982) 2 S.C.C. 583.
290. See Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar, (1988) Supp. S.C.C. 734.
291. Id. at 734, 736.
292. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, S.
Rep. No. 382-5, at 1435 (1997).
The report regarding India states: Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are grossly
overcrowded, often housing over three times their designed capacity. The largest class of
prisoners typically sleeps on bare floors, has inadequate sanitary facilities, and receives
inadequate food and medical care. Overcrowding in jails is severe. According to a state-
ment in Parliament in 1994 by the Minister of State for Home Affairs, New Delhi's Tihar
Jail, considered one of the best-run in the country, housed 8,577 prisoners - - facilities de-
signed to hold 2,487. According to the Minister, 7,505 detainees awaited the completion of
their trials, while 672 others had been on trial 3 years or longer. Press reports, state-
ments in court cases, and statements by government officials indicate that conditions re-
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293. See Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 191.
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protection of any group in India, certainly it should be exercised for the
protection of this utterly vulnerable lot. As Winston Churchill re-
minded us many years ago: "the mood and temper of the public in re-
gard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfail-
ing tests of civilization of any country. 294
A sad and deplorable feature of the Indian polity is that Parliament
and the executive have on several occasions effectively abdicated their
constitutionally defined responsibilities. These defaults, when they oc-
cur, are a breakdown not only of the substantive scheme of the Consti-
tution, a failure to protect human rights. In these circumstances, the
Court has had no choice but to step in to fill the void. This has led to its
inescapable involvement in the formulation and implementation of
broad social policy often impinging on controversial matters. To give
just two examples: although the Constitution declared as violative of
the Fundamental Rights, the practice of bonded labor, and commanded
Parliament to make a law declaring this an offense, it was only in 1976
that a Bonded Labor Prohibition Act was enacted. The tragic conse-
quence of this brazen abdication of responsibility by the august body of
elected representatives was that freedom from exploitation, a Funda-
mental Right remained a chimera for about a quarter of a century.
For five decades each succeeding government has callously ignored
Article 38-A in Part IV that mandates the state to provide free legal
services to the poor. It was left to the judiciary to declare free legal
services to be a justiciable right and direct the executive to fulfill its
mandate in this regard. Defending the Court's role in this regard, Mr.
Ahmadi, who recently retired as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
observed:
When such (aggrieved) citizens raise grave constitutional issues and
exercise their fundamental rights in invoking its jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court is left with little choice but to act in deference to its con-
stitutionally prescribed obligations. This is the reason why the Court
has had to expand its jurisdiction, by at times, issuing novel directions
to the executive; something it would never have resorted to had the
other two democratic institutions functioned in an effective manner.295
Prolonged systemic injustice in a democracy can only survive for so
long. Grave consequences would ensue if the Court were to turn a blind
eye to the government agencies' 'lawlessness' or to the abdication of
their constitutional responsibilities. The state would then be left free to
transgress the law and what would result is subversion of the rule of
law. Thus "it is essential that rule of law must wean the people away
from the lawless street and win them for the Court of law."296 Any fail-
ure to do so would threaten the survival of our constitutional system no
less than the subversion by a skillful, ruthless, neighboring foreign en-
emy. This is a very important reason why the Supreme Court must re-
294. P. LAL, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 12 (S. Chand & Co. 1989).
295. See Judicial Activism, supra note 242, at 11 (emphasis added).
296. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 568.
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main in the vanguard in enforcing human rights.
Judicial activism has other beneficial effects. In one sense, the
Court acts as a "teacher of the community." The Court's crucial direc-
tives to the government and appointment of individuals as commissions
of enquiry enhance the political visibility of human rights violations,
serve to ignite effective legislative action, raise public consciousness
and create opportunities for individuals and institutions297 to make
meaningful contributions for the realization of constitutional values.
What Eugene Rostow has written in the context of the United States
Supreme Court holds good for its Indian counterpart as well:
The process of forming opinion in the United States is a continuous one
with many participants - Congress, the President, the press, political
parties, scholars, pressure groups and so on. The discussion of prob-
lems and the declaration of broad principles by the Court is a vital
element in the community experience through which American policy
is made. The Supreme Court is amongst other things an educational
body and the justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national semi-
nar.
298
This perception of the function of the Court in human rights cases
is one that appeals to me and which I find persuasive.
In articulating new rights and placing the mantle of constitutional
protection over a variety of claims, judges in India, have unhesitatingly
donned the robes of high priests, academicians, environmentalists and
social reformers. This serves as a reminder of the danger that they may
silence a just claim espoused by an unpopular group on the basis that
their collective wisdom finds it unworthy of constitutional protection.
For instance, homosexual men in India have demanded the repeal of a
few discriminatory provisions of the Indian Penal Code that criminal-
izes certain types of sexual activity. It is imperative that in the coming
years, "constitutional interpretation by the judges must view the defini-
tion of human rights with an expansive wisdom to interpret the text
purposively so as to preserve the right of all human beings to mutual
respect and concern."299
My emphasis has been on the importance of robust participation by
the Court in the task of translating the Constitution's promise into
meaningful action. I do not mean by my emphasis to suggest that the
Supreme Court is the sole agency to safeguard and advance human
297. In Sheela Barse v. Union of India, A.I.R. (1986) 3 S.C.C. 596, 632, the Court di-
rected the College of Social Work, University of Bombay to submit a report on the condi-
tions of women prisoners in Bombay.
In another case, the Court appointed the President of a University as a commissioner
with the task of submitting a report on the working and living conditions of migrant
workers in textiles (powerloom) production. See SOUTH GUJARAT UNIVERSITY, A REPORT
ON WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF TEXTILE WORKERS: A SURVEY (1985).
298. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 208 (1952).
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rights in a democratic society like India. While it is not the sole institu-
tion, it is nonetheless a crucial agency, sometimes perhaps - in the
light of a corrupt and an errant executive, an irresponsible Parliament
- a virtually indispensable one for the protection of human rights in
India. The Indian Constitution explicitly lacks much of what is identi-
fied with modern Indian Constitutionalism; it is the Supreme Court's
contribution that has established the impressive array of Fundamental
Rights as we know them today. I can, therefore, think of no good reason
why the Supreme Court should forsake its activism and revert to a re-
strained and passive role in the future.
Our founding fathers were men of great vision and integrity. In
fighting for liberation from colonial rule and drafting our national char-
ter - imbued with a socialistic spirit - they have both left us (their de-
scendants) a valuable heritage and expressed their basic faith in our
ability to solve through democratic processes the most complex prob-
lems. They had envisaged the Judiciary as a bastion of rights and of
justice, and, therefore, decided to rely on the Supreme Court to define
and enforce the guarantees of Part III. They were, in effect, acknowl-
edging the peculiar competence of that branch of government to perform
such crucial tasks. Such expectations, is after all, the heart of our con-
stitutional blueprint of justiciable Fundamental Rights. It is, therefore,
the judiciary's responsibility to ensure that their faith was not un-
founded. Indeed, on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of India's
independence, there is no more vital task to which we (citizens and the
judiciary) can dedicate ourselves. Our task is arduous but certainly not
insurmountable. A crucial ingredient in the success or failure of a na-
tional task of this magnitude is the dream that inspires hard and sus-
tained work and the vision that impels the enduring belief in the future
greatness of India. The eminent historian, E.P. Thompson's poignant
words will perhaps inspire us in our collective endeavor and give us
some idea of the momentous destiny that India is called upon to fulfill.
He writes:
India is not an important but perhaps the most important country for
the future of the world. All the convergent influences of the world run
through this society: Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Secular, Stalinist, Lib-
eral, Maoist, Democratic-Socialist, and Gandhian. There is not a
thought that is being thought in the East or the West which is not ac-
tive in some Indian mind. If that subcontinent is rolled up into
authoritarianism, if that varied intelligence and creativity should be
submerged into conformist darkness, it would be one of the greatest de-
feats of the human record, sealing the fate of a penumbra of other Asi-
atic nations.300
300. P. Lal, supra note 294, at 129.
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